股坛前辈的教训


股坛前辈的教训

-股市“三个五”
①五项原则:一要稳、二要准、三要等、四要狠、五要忍;
②五种忌诲:一忌贪、二忌怕、三忌急、四忌悔、五忌拖;
③五个条件:知识、耐性、胆识、健康和资本。

-股市三类人:
①先知先觉者大口吃肉,
②后知后觉者还可以啃点骨头,
③不知不觉者则要掏钱买单了。

-得到的时候要懂得珍惜,不要等到失去的时候才知道珍贵。有钱赚的时候为什么不走?即使卖错了也只是少赚而已,为什么非要等到亏损时才想着要斩仓呢?适可而止,见好就收,一旦有变,落袋为安。常赚比大赚更重要,它不仅使你的资金雪球越滚越大,而且可以令你保持一个良好的心态。

-股市是戰場,是看不到硝煙的戰場, 這裡看不到屍體和鮮血,但每隔幾年就有人被殘殺,如果你感覺不到那種殺氣和危險,那麼​​你不適合這個地方,你終有一天會被消滅,還不知道是怎麼被消滅的。

-股市是風險最大、最難賺錢的地方,其難度僅次於期貨市場, 所有的陷阱外面都是鮮花盛開,而所有的機會外面都是荊棘密布,如果你沒有分辨的能力,其結果一定是因錯失良機而懊悔,因踏入陷阱而痛苦。輕鬆的背後一定有十倍不輕鬆的障礙。天上不會掉下禮物,世上沒有免費的午餐。

-官有缘授发达秘笈:人家害怕购买时你就买, 当人人都要买时你出售! 我不做长期投资, 我只探讨今,明年取得盈利增长的企业; 我不买官联公司, 种植, 石油天然气, 銀行承包与房地产公司, 以及小型公司。我几时会脱售? 公司单季盈利减少, 我会减持一些, 若公司连续两季盈利下滑, 我会积极脱售。我的投资黃金法则就是公司今年赚得比去年多, 本益比不超12。 当公司宣布盈利增长时, 股价肯定会上涨。

-如果偏向巴菲特模式就买棕油股长期持有,这个市场是很有前景的,全世界只有印尼和我国适合种植。竞争较大的产品就是豆油,而豆油的质量也不如棕油,一旦遇上高温,品质会变劣。那么就可以买BKAWAN,KLK,PBBANK后什么不用做,长期拥有就行了 - 2014年官有缘先生(官有缘讲座)

-根据情绪进行投资可分为三个阶段,叫“散户三部曲”。
买股三部曲:
第一部:熊市——股价低沉,市场淡静,散户绝迹股市,股市死气沉沉。其实,这个时候,大部分股票的价值都被低估,但散户不感兴趣,他们感兴趣的是股价,不是股票的价值。所以他们不买。
第二部:牛皮靠稳——股市上升了一截,散户还是不要买。因为他们在低价时没有买进,现在股价已上升了二、三十巴仙,他们心有不甘,买不下手。
第三部:牛市形成——综指破五关斩六将,冲上一千四百点,散户们见猎心喜,见亲朋戚友捞得风生水起,信心大增,乃大肆进场。就在兴高采烈时,次房事件演成股灾,引出了卖出的三部曲
卖出三部曲:
第一部:利润不多,而牛气逼人,他当然不会卖。
第二部:综合指数跌至1300点,他认为这是暂时性的,不久就会回升,所以决定不卖。况且高价时有得赚,现在反而亏本,他们不甘愿卖。
第三部:综合指数直线下跌,跌破1200点,他有大祸临头之感,信心崩溃了,不计成本抛出。结果发现他是以最低价卖出。
买进三部曲的特点是:高买。卖出三部曲的特点是:低卖。高买低卖,刚好跟股市金言——低买高卖适得其反。你想在股市赚钱吗?如果想的话,很简单,只要将买的和卖的三部曲,颠倒来做就行了。这叫倒行逆施。这就是”反向”。

冷眼以鸟瞰方式来洞悉世界经济全态,并赋予宽广胸襟接纳负面讯息。不妨翻覆此话:
地球不会停止转动,经济的大列车是不会停止前进的,因为人的基本需求永远存在,人类追求更美好生活的欲望,永不消失,故民办经济只有一个方向——前进,明天的世界只有一个景观——更美好。这种情形,就好象地球不会停止转动那么肯定。
唯有建立了这个信心之后,你才有胆色在经济最糟糕的时刻,在股市疮痍满目时,当所有的经济学家,当所有的大众传播媒介——电视、电台、报章、研究机构一致认为全球经济将陷入大萧条时,成为股市的独行侠,大胆大量买进股票,享有丰厚的回酬。”

博主推荐

股東的信(巴菲特) 分享(冷眼) 投资与投机(klse.8k) 买美国未来 公司年报分析 股市新闻 投資功課 价值计算

blog里内容大多来自各主流报章财经, 公司年报, 自我意见, 观察等。 如有失误, 尽请指点: maturemanKLSE@gmail.com, 谢谢。


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12.11.14

37歲賺夠錢退休?



在现今的社会, 样样事物都以表面外观而先入为主的世界, 看到商业周刊一則不錯的逆向思考文章, 觉得真正的大师都是谦虚低调的。。。

沒有富爸爸,原物料投資大師吉姆‧羅傑斯(Jim Rogers.)卻能在37歲就賺夠錢、提早退休,他到底有什麼祕訣?

4月才造訪台灣,掀起投資旋風的羅傑斯,5月於新加坡接受《Smart智富》月刊獨家專訪,分享自己如何學習理財、提早退休的心得。

羅傑斯說:「你要退休,得先餵飽自己,你要打點自己穿甚麼,所以得要有錢,不然就成了睡在公園的流浪漢!」可是,每個人退休需要的錢不一樣。「你覺得你退休需要多少錢,跟我不會相同。我沒有車,從沒擁有超過1棟房子,但有些人有5棟房子才退休,5輛車子、5個女朋友,什麼東西都5個,哈哈哈!」羅傑斯幽默地談著,「要有足夠的錢,一定要先存錢;愛消費是一個錯誤。」以下是羅傑斯針對存錢、投資的口述紀要:

第1步:學會存錢,且不輕易消費

現代年輕人愛花錢,不愛存錢,我覺得這是一個錯誤(雙手一攤,很無奈的表情)。我年輕時一定存錢,盡可能的多存,現在連我女兒都有5個小豬撲滿,我讓她從5歲開始練習存錢。通常投資之前必須先存錢,然後慢慢投資才可能成功,一般都是這個方法。

我真的覺得年輕時喜歡消費是個錯誤,但如果他們真想這麼做,那就做吧!又不是我的錢,也不用跟任何人報備。但就我所知,要成功一定要先能夠存錢。以我來說,我很少買衣服(比比身上破了一個小洞的Polo衫),4、5年才買一次衣服,我也很少買其他東西,物質欲望很低。

第2步:研究徹底,會有更多訊息

存夠了錢,你可以開始準備投資;但投資的態度要很謹慎,如果一輩子只能投資20次,你一定會很謹慎的研究吧!

讀雜誌可以當做是開始,然後做自己的功課。就像很多人對車子、時尚感興趣,當你真的感興趣,就會多方蒐集資料,而當你真的對車子很了解的時候,你自然會知道哪些是好車,什麼時候市場會有轉變,就會知道得比華爾街(意指分析師)還多。
假如我要投資一家公司,我會詳讀每一份財務報告,包括最細微的註解。我也會想盡辦法查證財務報告的準確性,或是最高經營階層宣稱的未來預測。這一切都做完後,除非我有把握比98%的華爾街分析師更了解這家公司,否則不會把錢投進去。

如果要投資一個國家,我會親自到這個國家去看看有沒有貨幣黑市市場。政府匯兌率與黑市匯兌率之間的差異大小,代表這個國家的問題有多嚴重,公定的與黑市的匯兌率差異愈大,國家問題愈大。

注意到最細小的枝微末節,是成功和失敗的關鍵。世界上只有一種方式能使你得到的訊息比別人多、更占優勢,那就是「鉅細靡遺的徹底研究」。

第3步:不追多頭,專找空頭市場

我能賺大錢、提早退休的一個原因是我從不追多頭,而是反其道尋找空頭市場。大部分的投資者尋找的是多頭而忽略空頭,一旦人們為某個炒作過頭的股市瘋狂,而忽略其他好投資,這時通常是我找到好交易的時候。

一般來說,有兩種方法可以檢視特定市場是否為空頭,第一是歸納法,就是從觀察中得到結論。例如,股票和原物料市場多頭交替出現,股票價格不佳時,原物料商品表現比較好,反之亦然,這個循環大約有15年到23年。所以按照歷史先例,原物料市場的多頭可以看好到2014年至2022年之間。

另一個是演繹法(deduction),就是從邏輯中得到結論。以家樂氏(Kellogg's)為例,當原物料市場低迷時,原料成本穩定,公司淨利自然上升,股價也會上升。反過來當原物料價格上升,公司成本上升,但不可能把增加的成本反映到售價上,連帶拖累股票價格。找出原物料和股票為何負相關,這是很好的心智練習。

第4步:獨立判斷,不受別人影響

我年輕時,經常被別人的勸告沖昏頭,沒有聽從自己內心的決定,奇怪得很,每次這種投資都失敗。後來我不再讓別人影響我,並根據自己所下的決定採取行動。直到年過30,我終於認定這是最佳投資之道,我會成功是因為自己遵照了這些原則。
你要做很多功課、研究,千萬不要投資自己不熟悉的標的,千萬不要聽信媒體、報紙、雜誌的消息,追隨別人的腳步(笑,呵呵呵)。假如你追隨別人的腳步,你永遠不會成功;當你聽到某人說他要去買某支股票或炒短線,只做當日沖銷,通常是他們太亢奮,以致高估市場。在這種情況下,你不可能賺到錢,在任何領域都不可能成功。

第5步:感覺無所不能時,就危險了

做完足夠的研究後,就動手買股票。買下足以說服你的股票,然後等待時機轉變,就會獲得戲劇性的報酬;換言之,你知道你在等什麼(you stay in what you know)。所以大多數時間,你什麼也不用做,你就是坐在那邊等,等你看到錢已經出現在轉角,你就彎腰把它撿起來。多數時候你什麼也沒做,望著窗外發呆,把錢放在銀行,等待機會。

另外,不論什麼時候你開始感覺自己無所不能,趕快停下來,什麼都不要做,因為再投資,就危險了,因為你開始跟別人的想法一樣了。記得坐下來休息一下,克服感染你的烏合之眾心理學。

原文來自>>>http://smartold.businessweekly.com.tw/webarticle.php?id=33503&p=1

9.11.14

冷眼2014年分享锦集 : 股市策略(下篇)


冷眼2014年最新发表作, 真是兴奋的慢慢阅读, 在此也幫南洋商報打个广告.  :)

原文來自>>>  http://www.nanyang.com/node/660925


分享锦集:不买无基本面股票(下篇)


股市投资要坚持一个原则:绝不买没有基本面的股票。
惟有具备强稳基本面的股票,长期持有,价值才会与日俱增;万一你买进后,熊市出现,你持守下去,在牛市重临时,由于所持股票,价值已上升,则在股市回弹中,其弹升幅度,可超越大势。
如果你所持股票,具有强稳的基本面,股价跌得越低,你可以放心买进更多,以拉低成本,提高胜算。
如果你在买进时,价值已被低估了。当股价跌得更低时,不是被低估得更利害吗?参股的成本越低,越是本小利大,为什么不敢加码?暴跌后不敢加码买进,多数是因为功课做得不够,不了解其价值,心里没有底。只看股价,不看价值,不理会基本面的投机者,不可能在股市投资成功。
但要切记,只有具备强稳基本面的股票,才可加码买进,没有基本面的股票,买得越多,亏得越惨,最后可能血本无归,慎之,慎之!
不敢加码就不应买
如果在股价崩溃后,你不敢加码买进,一开始就根本不应该买进该股。
如果你做足功课,对上市公司瞭如指,知道个别股票的价值,在股市下跌时,就有信心坚守你手中的股票,或是乘低吸购,买进好股。
如果平时不做功课,对股票的价值一无所知,股市逆转时就会因为恐惧而不敢买进,失去投资良机。
基本面强股票特征
1.有合理的盈利
2.有合理的股息
3.有适度的成长
4.财务稳健
5.股价合理
买股票就是买股份
买股票就是买公司的股份,买公司的股份就是参股做生意,参股做生意的惟一目的是赚钱,公司不赚钱,我们为什么要参股呢?所以,你买进的股票一定要有合理的盈利,不赚钱的公司的股票,千万不要买。
没股息不要买
参股做生意,总希望公司赚钱后,将部份盈利分给股东,使股东有收入。有些公司钱是赚到了,只是以保留资金作为发展之类的借口,不分股息给股东,有违当初股东投资的意愿。
所以,没有派发股息的公司的股票,最好不要买,以免在股市下跌后,你长期持守,却什么也得不到。
其实,注重股息,除了现金收入外,更重要的是此类公司通常都长期盈利稳定,风险较低。对于不肯花时间去研究股票的投资者,尤其重要,因为可以避开许多陷阱。
假如你没有时间或是不会研究股票的话,坚持只买具备第②点,即“有合理股息”的股票,最少可以减少一半买错股票的风险。
适度成长保持盈利
第③点“有适度的成长”:企业的经营成本,与日俱增,如员工需要加薪,租金可能上升……等,一个没有成长的企业,很难维持盈利,更不要说增加了。盈利下降,就无法保持派息,股价也会每况愈下。
即使公司有盈利,又派发股息,但如果没有成长,股价表现也往往逊于大势。
你的投资,很难增值,中钢(CSC)就是一个典型例子。
有适度成长(moderate growth)的企业,长期持有其股票,多数可以取得可观的回酬。
有了盈利、股息和成长,还要有强稳的财务状况,企业才经得起经济风暴的考验,股票才值得买进。
买此类企业的股票,可以高枕无忧。
负债不高现金流强
“财务强稳”的一个特征,是负债不过高,而现金流量强劲。
有些公司不但没有负债,而且还持有大笔现金,财务稳如泰山,则即使公司业务偶然受挫,也必能安渡难关。这类公司,也有能力攫取新的投资机会,将企业推向一个新的高峰。
现金为王
从消极角度看,长期拥有大量现金,被视为企业主没有充分利用资源,以加速企业盈利的增长。
但从积极的角度看,此类股票具有强韧的生命力,经得起暴风雨的吹袭,“现金为王”,此言不虚。
我发现一些上市公司,有盈利,有股息(不高),也有成长。可是庞大的负债,始终高居不下,而“应收账款”也总是有增无减。在经济前景模糊不清,股价又偏高的情况下,我劝大家对此类外强中干的公司,避之则吉。
有了盈利、股息、成长、财务也稳健。如果股价太高,也不可购买。购买价值被高估的股票,等于购买几年后的价值。
现在买进,不是一项好的投资,健力士英格(GAB)肯定是最棒的蓝筹股,具备了作为优质股的所有条件。但是,假如你在去年年中时,以22令吉买进的话,就不是明智的投资。现在该股跌至13令吉,投资者损失不赀。
所以,即使是好股,也要股价合理才值得买进。
10倍本益比
所谓合理的股价,我的标准是10倍的本益比(PER)。
不过,这10倍是否合理,还要取决于公司的成长。如果成长较高,而且相当稳定,10至15倍的本益还是可以被接受,如果没有成长的话,10倍的本益比已属偏高,应该在8倍以下才可买进。
5条件定选股成败
后“量化宽松”时代的股票投资策略:①绝不借钱买股票;②不买过份冷门的股票;③坚持只买基本面强稳的股票。
经过了5年的养育,这只小公牛已由“童牛”长成“成年牛”,没有人知道何时会变成“老牛”。
跟5年前相比,投资者现在想在股市赚钱,肯定要有更高的智慧。
“选股”将是成败关键。所选股票,必需符合以上5个条件。
美国“量化宽松”退场后,欧洲经济可能衰退,日本决定推出“量化宽松”,欧盟也对“量化宽松”跃跃欲试。
利率走势难以捉摸,股市前途充满变数,惟有拥有明确投资策略的投资者,才能在这种环境中有所作为。
有一点是肯定的:股市没有免费的午餐,有一分耕耘,才有一分的收获。
(完)

冷眼 


分享锦集:后量宽时代股市策略上篇)

8.11.14

冷眼2014年分享锦集 : 股市策略(上篇)


http://matureman2011.blogspot.com/2014/11/2014_8.html

看到南洋这一篇冷眼2014年最新发表作, 真是兴奋的慢慢阅读, 在此也幫南洋商報打个广告.  :)

原文來自>>>  http://www.nanyang.com/node/660775?tid=462

分享锦集:后量宽时代股市策略(上篇)

2008年美国次贷风暴所触发的金融海啸,将美国经济推到了悬崖的边缘,随时有掉得粉身碎骨的危险。美国联邦储备局(美联储)力挽狂澜于既倒,祭出“量化宽松”这一记险招,使美国经济转危为安。
所谓“量化宽松”,(Quantitative Easing,即QE)就是作为美国中央银行,肩负调控经济重任的美联储,通过大量吸购公债债券(Bonds),而将大量货币注入金融体系,以达到银根宽松的目的。
“量化”(Qualitative)是指货币市场中的货币供应数量,“宽松”(Easing)是指因货币供应充足而使银根松爽,也就是企业很容易获得融资。
美联储定期吸购债券
“量化宽松”计划的具体例子,是美联储向濒临破产的雷曼兄弟,收购6000亿美元(1.92兆令吉)的有抵押债券,使雷曼逃过了倒闭的噩运。
美联储通过定期吸购债券而将货币注入金融体系,这项行动在2010年达到巅峰。
在达到了拯救经济的目的以后,美联储乃分三期,逐步让“量化宽松”计划退场,第三期退场于最近完成。
对于股票投资者来说,最使他们担心的,是在“量化宽松”
退场后,美国利率可能上升。尽管美联储声明短期内不会调高利率,但投资界仍忐忑不安。
美股牵动全球股市
过去的经验显示,利率跟股市背道而驰,利息起,股市应声而跌。
大马股票投资者所应关注的,是在美国“量宽”结束后,美国的股市走向。因为全球股市,一向唯美国股市马首是瞻。
美国股市的一举一动,将牵动全球股市的神经线。
美国道琼斯指数,由80年代的不到一千点,以大涨小回头的态势,升至目前1万7000多点,成为美国历史上持续最久的牛市。
美国股市涨势还会持续吗?还会持续多久?
相信没有人能回答这个问题。
大马指数处历史高峰
再回头来看看我们大马股市,前景又将如何?
自2009年起,大马股市跟着美国股市而止跌回扬。综指由800多点回升至现在的1800多点。
在时间上,已持续上升了5年以上。
尽管在这过程中,大马股市曾经历多场虚惊,包括大马大选的冲击。但基本上,大势是向上。
个股翻数倍
大马指数只翻倍,但个别股票的价格,有许多却翻了几倍。
在2009年时,股票价值被严重低估,低垂的果子,比比皆是,采果子的人(投资者),只要一伸手,就可以采到又大又甜的果子(被低估的好股)。我当时曾经以“当知更鸟出现时”为题,写了一篇文章,鼓励大家趁低吸购;后来又以“不动如山两年”,建议大家紧握低价买进的好股,作为长期投资,放长线钓大鱼,赚取厚利“分享集”
的读者,不会不记得这两篇拙作。
即使在去年3月16日,大选的脚步渐近,大家都不看好股市时,我仍对股市前景保持乐观。那一天,我在《南洋商报》礼堂向1500名读者演讲,大胆预测大选过后,股市将创新高。
在过去一年半中,大马股市不是创新高,而是屡创新高。
老实说,股市之荣景,出乎我意料之外。现在,大马指数是站在历史性的最高峰。
手握现金或进场投资?
大马股市还会再上吗?已经五岁的公牛会不会“老当益壮”?
即使是股市中的宿将,对这个问题也持有不同的看法。
大马股市唯一的封闭式基金资本投资(ICAP)的掌舵人陈鼎武,在两年前已看淡股市,卖出大量股票,手握大量现金,等待股市倒塌来扫购便宜货。但股市两年来都跟他抬杠,到现在还没有给他买便宜货的机会。
资深专家看法两极
我国资深经济学家白文春,日前在一个研讨会中说房产过剩,不值得投资,他主张投资者转向股市投资。
对白先生的谈话,我的理解是,他认为股市还有作为,值得投资。他看好股市,跟陈鼎武的看淡刚好相反。
他们都是投资界的顶尖人物,尚且持有相反的看法,则一般的股票投资者,不知何去何从,就不足为奇。
在这种情况下,见识一般的股票投资大众,应该采取怎样的投资策略?
战胜股市首重无债
在股市偏高,而走向又不定的情况之下,投资者要采取的策略,是自我保护。
本身没有被股市击溃的弱点,等于立于不败之地。
能立于不败之地,就有可能战胜股市,达到赚钱的目的。
在这种情形之下,投资者首先要做到的是“无债一身轻”。
假如你购买股票的资金,一部份是向银行借来的话,那么,你现在第一件要做的事,是脱售部分股票,还清债务。做到你所持的股票,全部是以自己的资金买的。
股市严重低估时才可借
融资买股的一个铁则:是在熊市中,股票价值被严重低估时才可以借。理由是股价上涨的可能性很高,而且涨幅很大。赚钱的机会大增,你的还债能力强,还债不是问题。
同时,由于股价低廉,周息率(D/Y)高过利息。股息收入已足以还利息,股价上升就是净赚。
所以,在2009年股价奇低时,可以借钱买股,现在股价偏高,风险已增加,而周息率(D/Y)偏低,股息收入不足以还利息,借钱买股,不是明智之举。
所以,现在借不得。
最近出现了一个小股灾,据我所知,有些投资者欠了抵押贷款(MARGIN),深恐熊市出现,心里恐慌。在股价跌到最低时脱售股票,导致损失不赀。假如他没有负债的话,但会保持镇定,持守下去,就不会蒙受不必要的亏损。
避开低流通量冷门股
其次,最避免购买过份冷门的股票,以免在股市逆转时受困。
在一个偏高的股市中,当股票价值被高估时,或是企业出现了负面的因素,不值得我们继续投资下去。你需要脱售你的股票,如果交易过份稀少,你可能无法脱手。你就会被套牢,无法将股份转为现金。
有价无市难受惠
尤其是当你的投资额较大,所持股数较多时,你根本就无法兑现。
冷门股由于股票流通量过低,被投资者忽略,价值被长期低估,成为价值投资者的投资对象,问题是这类股票往往有价无市,价值无法浮现,使投资者无法受惠。
当股市处在高峰时,随时都可以出现逆转,持有交投过份稀少的冷门股,投资者可能因无法兑现而陷困,这也是投资风险之一。
为了慎防在股市逆转,正如最近突发的小股灾,你无法将股票兑现,最好避免购买过份冷门的股票。
低垂果子已被采光
一项不可否认的事实是,低垂的果子已被采光了,尽管又大又甜的果子还是可以找到,但是,都是挂在高高的枝头,采果人必须爬到树顶,才可以采摘到手。爬上树顶,一不小心,就会掉下来送命,比站在地上,伸手去采低垂的果子,风险肯定是高了几倍。
在这种情形之下,投资者就更加需要讲究策略,将来的投资成败,决定于你采取的策略,是否正确。
在这个时刻,孙子的一个战略,特别管用。孙子曰:“昔之善战者,先为不可胜,以待敌之可胜。
不可胜在己,可胜在敌”(形篇)。
预测股市难之又难
白话译文:“自古以来,善于作战的人,先要做到使自己不可被敌人战胜,然后等待战胜敌人的机会。不能被敌人战胜的主动权,在于自己的努力;能否战胜敌人,在于敌人那一方是否有机可乘”。
(任俊华、赵清文“孙子兵法正宗”)投资者的对手(敌人),就是股市,我们能否在股市克敌致胜,主动权不在投资者,而是在股市。因为股市变化莫测,其动向根本就不可捉摸,你企图通过预测股市起落来战胜股市,难之又难。
战胜股市的最可靠策略,是加强自己的备战工作,做到自己具备不被敌人战胜的条件(先为不可胜),然后等待战胜敌人的机会出现(以待敌之可胜)。
能否战胜股市,在于股市那一方是否有机可乘(股市继续上升),那是投资者无能为力的,但投资者可以做足功课,使自己有战胜股市的充足条件。



冷眼 


分享锦集:不买无基本面股票(下篇)




1.12.13

巴菲特學, Buffettology!

進入21世紀投資業界才真正體會巴菲特投資的成功,各大學商學所紛紛成立[巴學會][巴菲特學](Buffettology),認真研討為甚麼Buffett的投資會這麼成功(世人唯一累積財富達360億美元的投資家,直逼比爾蓋茲).

1. Expertise 專業的重要性 
-- 投資業界喜歡說:投資只有贏家沒有專家,Buffett以事實粉碎這似是實非的說法.巴菲特是哥大的商學碩士,主修投資管理,他的投資公司BerkshireHathaway就是投資管理理論及實務的最佳證明.早先很多學者認為他只是Random Walking隨機理論的例外,後來才真正體會到:他使用的投資方法正是被藏在象牙塔學術殿堂裡的Investment Management,他只是非常非常徹底地加以落實(Real Implementation)而已.

2. Value 價值是檢驗投資的唯一真理 
-- 一般投資人及業界很看重投資標的的價格(Price),而忘了投資只是[部位轉換](Position Change)的價值移轉活動.轉換成價值處於[貶值]的資產,當然投資要失敗,反之,握有價值處於[增值]的資產,根本沒有處份的道理.真理只有一個,巴菲特說:如果您沒辦法衡量企業的價值?那麼您就不應該投資(買進股票).技術分析師忙著預測股票價格走勢的同時,投資管理顧問用心及專業評估該企業真正的內在價值(Intrinsic Vale).

3. Time 時間才是累積財富的關鍵 
-- 投資人喜歡大談掌握[時機](Timing)是投資的成敗關鍵,巴菲特認為:沒有任何人能靠著預測股票市場或股價的買賣時機而累積財富,任何人都做不到(不管是不是諾貝爾經濟學得主還是市場主力).很多實證研究指出,長時間預測股價(投資時機)正確率是50-50,即以預測為依據買賣股票其預期的長期投資報酬率是接近零.跟真實界很多專業領域一樣,長時間的專注及堅持,才是事業成功的唯一保障.從Seeding到Tree及Fruits是需要耐心等待及堅定荷護的,一蹴可成短期獲利在真實界是找不到的,投資界也不例外.

4. ROE # ROI 股東權益報酬率 
-- 投資業界以 ROI(Return on Investment)投資報酬率來衡良投資企業或組合的績效,巴菲特認為不能只考慮企業股本(Shares)的投資報酬,要整個[股東權益](Owner Equity)一起考量.也就是企業主如何專業及理性的運用(Using)企業的保留盈餘及資本公積,也是企業永續經營非常重要的原因,所以他以 ROE(Return on Equity)來衡量企業的投資績效.

5. Owner Earning 業主盈餘
-- 投資業界只是以該企業的盈餘或EPS來表示其獲利情況,巴菲特認為該企業的[現金流量](Cash Flow)能力才是衡量營運獲利能力的基礎,他會把盈餘加上折舊及灘提再減掉企業本業的資本投入(再投資)得到當期的[業主盈餘]. 同樣的道理,巴菲特主張 Look Through Earning 完整盈餘的觀念,用來衡量部份持股企業的真正獲利能力.也即是以該投資佔該企業持股百分比計算投資績效,而不是一般會計原則以真實配股配息為盈餘計算.

6. Growth is Value 成長就是最重要的價值 
-- 投資業界習慣劃分所謂:價值投資學派(Vale Investing)及成長投資學派(Growth Investing),巴菲特常被認為屬於價值投資學派.但是巴菲特指出:成長事實上就是價值的一重要部份,一家企業如果其盈餘不能隨著時間成長(價值增值),那麼根本不值得投資該企業.他特別說明,成長不一定是其本業營收獲利盈餘一直成長,也可能是企業經營者有效運用其保留盈餘,隨著時間的增長產生巨大的複利效應.沒有盈餘成長就表示其處於價值貶低狀況,所以成長投資法跟價值投資法是一體二面觀念一致的.

7. Mr. Market 市場先生 
-- 巴菲特經常舉其老師葛拉罕的[市場先生]觀念,說明資本市場是個情緒不很穩定的[事業合夥人](Partnership).如果企業獲利成長前景看好,市場先生急著要買下您所有的事業股權;反之,處於不景氣狀況的經營環境,它確忙著想把其股權賣給您不管是任何價位.巴菲特說:市場先生顯然是理性投資人的好朋友,但絕不是位很好老師.跟隨市場先先的智慧做投資決策,那麼後果將會非常糟糕.資本市場是根據市場的[供][需]法則運作的,很多時候受到當時的[金融圈]對特定公司(Company)/特定產業(Field)/特定經濟環境的市場評價(Market Appraisal )所左右,但是這類市場評價不一定跟真實的企業評價(Business Valuation)一致,導至整個市場處於無效率或不均衡的狀態. 

8. Good Company 優良企業 
-- 巴菲特受到其另一位恩師 Philips Fisher(費雪) 的影響,認為要既要投資就只投資最最優良的企業(Leading Company).巴菲特說:如果這家企業不是我非常尊敬(其老闆其產品其服務其品牌),那麼我絕不投資.他認為同樣的一塊美金,他的錢不比別人不值錢,為甚麼只能投資在二流公司,他只要最最一流的公司.巴菲特認為:把錢投入普通企業是不可能累積財富的.市場短時間是個選票機,長時間是個體重器;對於優良企業,時間永遠是站在它那一邊,路遙知馬力,日久才能見其心.  

9. Boss Attitudes 老闆心態 
-- 巴菲特認為每次投資都是以自己是該公司老闆的心態來評估,即使只是在資本市場買進股票或部份股權,他還是以:買下整間公司的方法及心態來評估其價值.這種[老闆心態]可以說是投資管理方法的核心觀念,股票持有人就是該企業的老闆之一,他真正關心的是該企業治理及經營獲利狀況,絕不會貪圖賺取其股票的價差.如果整天想著低買高賣該公司股票,他是個交易商(Trader)而非投資家(Investor),更不可能是該公司真正的老闆. 

10. Margin of Safety 安全邊際 
-- 巴菲特說:他不敢一刻忘記其老師葛拉罕教給他的[安全邊際]觀念.由於經濟狀況及企業經營環境變動很大,即使定期重新專業評估企業內在價值,也可能產生估算誤差.當評估其現金流量折現產生企業內在價值時,一定會產生[容錯誤差].葛拉罕是個數學家,他知道估算可能會有共變異狀況,誤差是能接受也是難免的.他提出[安全邊際]理論,承認容錯誤差且希望能在投資決策時預留安全邊際來避免評估風險.安全邊際觀念如果以簡單字眼解釋就是[物美價廉]的老祖宗商業法則.Good Company Good Price 以好價錢買進的優良企業必能以好價錢賣出,巴菲特就是謹守其老師的安全邊際觀念,非常有耐心的等待優良企業的股價偏低於其內在價值時才建立投資部位,讓他的投資部位能[立於不敗]處於很低的持有成本(Holding Costing) 

11. Buy and Hold 永續投資 
-- 很多人以為巴菲特只是買進不賣出(Buy and Hold),事實上這是不瞭解投資管理理論[資本回收](Capital Return)的誤解.巴菲特非常重視資本回收,因為他認為所謂[永續投資]就是以資本回收然後[再投資] (Re-Investment)為基礎.投資管理的回收管理就是試圖一再降低持股成本(Costing Down),以至於經由資本回收達到原有組合[零成本投資](Zero Costing).另外一層意義是:經由不斷的現金部位回收,就能永不停止的再建立優良部位,讓整個投資由樹而林逐漸累積成巨富. 

12. Good Money 良幣法則 
-- 巴菲特主張 : Ethic Investing 道德投資,他強調[為富常樂] Wealth within Goodness.他個人雖是全球首富但生活還是很簡單樸實,他最討驗奢華的企業及經營者,尊崇那些不浪費不亂投資的企業經理人.他認為優良投資的資金就能形成[良弊](Good Money),投入在優良企業協助優良經理人從事對社會國家真正有用的貢獻.巴菲特可以說把整個[資本主義]的精髓發揮到最高境界.Good Person - Good Money - Good Company 好人擁有好錢,投入好公司.對巴菲特而言,每個人金錢的品質是不相同的.

以上资料来自berkshire_taiwan.tripod.com/index.htm

格雷厄姆投資哲學 (Benjamin Graham)


Graham在其專業領域的傑出成就上存在著一項顯著特色,即絕不圍繞在單一宗旨的狹隘心智活動.他能在觀念/時間與精神上提供絕對開放毫無保留的慷慨態度.如果需要清晰的思考,則無其它更好的去處.如果需要鼓勵或建議,則Graham將是倚靠.

葛拉罕(Graham)是美國哥倫比亞大學商學研所的教授,可以說是現代投資管理的創始人.近五十年來,Graham所創導的[穩健原則]始終為其追隨者帶來可觀的報酬.即使這些追隨者的天賦遠遜於其他更有才華的投資者,後者卻因為遵循耀眼或時髦的理論而失敗.

1. 投資與投機( Intelligent Investor ) :

Graham在其撰寫的投管著作Security Analysis中,便試圖界定投資者(Investor)與投機客(Speculator)兩者之間的區別,引述內容如下:投資行為必須經過透徹的分析,詳盡的規劃,確保本金的安全與適當的報酬.不符合上述條件的行為即是投機.

Graham指出三種不智的投機行為:1)從事頭機卻認為是投資.2)以嚴肅而非消遣的態度從事投機,卻又不具備鄉關的知識與技巧.3)投機所涉及金額超過承擔虧損的範圍.

Graham說:真正的投資者甚少被迫賣出持股,而在其它時候,則無需在乎當時的市場價格.若投資者因其持股價格不合理的下跌,容許自己陷入恐慌或不當的憂慮,無異於將其根本的優勢變為劣勢.對這類人來說,如果股票完全沒有報價,或許堆他們更有利.

所以Graham覺得:投資者與投機客之間的真正區別在於他們對於股價走勢的態度.投機客的主要興趣在於預測行情的波動,並從中牟利.投資者的主要興趣在以適當的價格取得並持有企業.

2. 投資者與市場( Mr. Market ) :

Graham說道:歷史上無窮的經驗顯示,我們絕對無法預測未來的證卷價格.投資者為了迅速獲利而買進賣出,他將無法期待這樣的交易方式的績效會優於市場大盤.就長期來說,結果幾乎必然相反.

Graham認為投資者應該瞭解市場波動的可能性,而且在財勿及心理上有所準備.如果希望在市場價格的變動中獲利,或以有利的價格買進賣出,他的期待的難免的.但是,其間涉及的真正危險,也是投資與投機的重要界線.

Graham語重心長的說:規勸你不可投機,這對我們而言十分簡單,但遵從我們的規勸,對你卻可能相當困難.

雖然普通股的價格經常出現大幅波動,投資人可以運用二種可行的方法:

1)掌握時效(Timing):預期股票市場的行為,判斷走勢上升則買進,判斷走勢下降則賣出.

2)掌握價格(Pricing):在股票價格低於合理價值時買進,在股票價格高於合理價值時賣出.

Graham認為,Timing即是投機的行為,Pricing才能長期投資.我們相信,人們介入華爾街愈深,將愈懷移行情預測或掌握時效的可信度.對於每天出現的無數行情預測,投資人也不必認真對待.

3. 投資者與投資顧問( IM Consultant ) :

根據Graham的定義:在商業活動中,投資管理是相當獨特的,因為它在某種程度上始終需要接受別人的意見.

如果有人從事投資是為了賺錢,則他們尋求的投資意見便是要求別人告訴他們如何賺錢.這種行為頗為愚昧.企業經營者會在經營方面徵求專業的意見,但不期望別人教導他們如何賺錢.這是他們自己的專業.當有人倚賴別人賺取投資利潤時,他們所期待的結果便有異於一般的商業活動.

假設投資管理有合理可預期的收益,則投管顧問的角色便很容易釐清.他會運用其優異的訓練與經驗防範客戶犯錯,並確保他們的資金獲得應有的收益.唯有客戶要求超乎正常的收益時,或投管顧問試圖提供更好的報酬時,問題於是產生,究竟是客戶的要求過份?或是投管顧問的承諾不合理?

對於投管顧問,我們的根本主張是:如果投資人處理資金時,主要是倚賴別人的意見,則他必須將自己與其顧問嚴格限制在專業/守,甚至是缺乏想像力的投資形式.要不然他必須與顧問保持非常密切的關係.投資人與投管顧問之間若存在著一般業務或專業的關係,則可以接受較積極進取的投資建議,但仍只限於他擁有充份的瞭解,而足以獨立判段別人所提供的建議者.

真正專業的投管顧問(專業的顧問公司),收取委託客戶的年費,其自許與承諾都很平穩.大致上,客戶資金的投資標的大多屬於支付合理預期報酬的企業,其整體收益主要取決於它們的一般投資專業及經驗.在典型的狀況下,除了領導企業的股票及公司債,其它投資通常不超過總資金的10%,它們也不會試圖從大盤的震盪走勢中獲利.

主要的投管顧問公司不會渲染其績效,卻以謹慎/保守和適任而自傲.它們的主要目標是長期保障本金的價值,並提供保守而可接受的收益.任何超過上述目標的成果,它們都視為例外項目.它們的主要價值或許在於保障客戶免於代價昂貴的錯誤.它們所提供的服務也正是防禦型投資者何所得到的合理服務.

4. 防禦型投資者( D Type Investor ) :

防禦型投資者必須將持股侷限在主要公司,它們擁有長期的盈餘記錄與穩健的財務狀況,任何稱職的投管顧問都可以提出一張清單.

Graham對於防禦型投資者提出三個參考意見:

1)投資者可以購買信譽卓越的指數型基金,其收取的管理及收續費很低,能替代自己建立股票投資組合.

2)如果資金相當充裕,則可以與優秀的投管顧問公司往來,這樣可以讓投資計劃獲得專業的管理.

3)自己執行[成本攤平法](Doll Cost Averaging),這是指投資者每月或每季以固定金額購買主要公司優良普通股.依此方式進行投資,股價較低時,所買進的股數將多於股價較高時,結果所有的持股的股價將趨於合理.

5. 進取型投資者( A Type Investor ) :

進取型投資者可以購買其它類型的普通股(風險層級較高的優良企業),但絕對要根據智慧的分析從事選股.進取型投資者當然希望並預期獲得更好的整體績效,但是他首先必須確定其績效不會更差.人們投下大量的精力,研究與才賦在華爾街的活動,卻以虧損收場.上述美德若被引往錯誤的方向,將無異於自損.

Graham對於進取型投資者提出三個參考意見:

1)短線的選擇:這意味股票的買進是根據公司盈餘增加,或預期公司有其他有利的發展.

2)長線的選擇:這通常是強調過去極佳的成長記錄,並且認為這會持續下去.

3)廉價的選擇:價值與價格產生偏差時,股票走勢總會過度延伸,優良企業被不合理的偏見而被低估時.

6. 企業盈餘( Enterprise Earning ) :

Graham認為企業的合理價值是其一段期間內的盈餘折現值,所以企業盈餘可以說是企業評價的核心.不過他也提出二項忠告:

1)不可過於認真地看待單一年份的盈餘數字.

2)如果你過度重視短期盈餘,則必須留意每股盈餘數字所隱藏的陷阱.

Graham認為投資界太過著重每季的盈餘,這容易對投資者造成誤導.公司會計制度變化多端,對於智慧型投資人而言,或許最適當的態度是確信自己是以好價格買進股票.

7. 股利政策( Share Policy ) :

Graham主張股東應該以更明智更主動的態度對待管理階層,下列情況下,股東有權利質疑管理階層的經營能力:

1)績效本身不理想.

2)相對於其它類似的企業,績效比較差.

3)績效導致股票價格長期不振.

企業以其獲利再進行投資,理論上是非常合理的行為,如果其保留盈餘可以創造更大的盈餘.

Graham認為股票股利(stock dividends)就是股票分割(stock splits),其目的在於降低股票的市場價格,因為潛在的股東比較願意接受低股價.股票股利將某筆資金從保留盈餘轉到資本帳戶,事實上對於整個企業的[股東權益](Equity)並沒有任何影響.我們沒有任何經驗相信,一家表現平庸的企業,其原有的管理階層可以繼續使用股東的資金從事擴張,並且讓股東從中受益. 

8. 比較企業( Enterprise Compare ) :

企業評價的基礎是一套能比較兩家企業何者較優的評量體系,Graham認為有六個很重要的指標,可以用來比較企業:

1)Profitability(獲利性):特別著重其[淨利率]

2)Stability(穩定性):以過去十年中,某一年每股盈餘相對於其前三年平均盈餘的最大跌幅,藉此衡量其穩定度.

3)Growth成長性:成長顯然是預估盈餘的最重要因子.

4)Financial Position(財務狀況):流動比率/負債比率/資本結構等因子.

5)Dividends(股利):持續而不曾間斷的股利政策.

6)Price history(歷史股價):時間拉長,平均市場股票價格也是比較企業的重要因子. 

9. 安全保障( Coverage Cushion ) :

在投資管理中最可靠且最值得推崇的分析領域,是投資級優先股或公司債的安全性(品質).評估的準則是:該公司過去若干年來的盈餘相對於利息總支出的倍數.這就是Graham所謂的:利息保障倍數(Coverage),一般都是以七年的平均值估算.

Graham認為,對於普通股的安全保障,除了[盈餘]外,還應加入下列三個保障標準:

1)企業規模(capital scale):

2)股票/股東權益比率(stock/equity ratio):

3)資產價值(asset value):

投管經驗顯示,投資的安全性取決於企業的獲利能力,盈餘一旦衰退,資產將喪失其應有的價值.對於投資於公司的優先股或公司債,凡能符合嚴格的安全性標準者,多半都可以成功的因應未來的變化.

10. 資本因子( Capitalization Factor ) :

普通股的理論分析在於其企業價值(value)的評估,並藉此與當時的股票價格(price)做比較,判斷該企業是否值得集結買進.

Graham主張企業評價的方法是先估計未來數年的平均盈餘,再乘以適當的[資本化因子](capitalization factor).估計未來盈餘能力的標準程序,通常是過去的平均銷售額/售價及毛利率為起點.然後據此資料估計未來銷售量與價格水準的變動,推算未來營業額.

企業未來的平均盈餘雖然是企業價值的主要決定因子,不過專業的企業評價還會納入資本比率(capital rate),該比率取決於公司的品質,數值視各別企業有很大的差異,Graham提出下列五個重要的[資本因子]:

1)長期的一般展望:

2)管理團對:

3)財務力量與資本結構:

4)股息的記錄:

5)當期的股利率:

Graham提出一個很重要的投資觀念,他說:智慧型投資人會專注於未來比較能預測的類股或公司,或是專注於過去績效價值的安全保障遠高於當價格的個股,並只在此情況下承擔未來變動的風險.

投資管理就是風險管理,獲得安全保障且降低風險是投管成功的不二法門. 

11. 安全邊際( Margins of Safety ) :

Graham在心態上始終格守:買進的標的是企業,而非企業的股票.他偶爾會買下整個企業,但是他經常只購買企業的一小部份.不論買進整體或一部份的企業,他所秉持的態度完全相同.在投資組合中,有些人持有幾十種的股票,有些人則集中在少數幾支股票.但是,每個人都受惠於企業市場價格與其內含價值之間的差異.

以0.4美元的價格買進1美元的紙鈔,人若不能夠立即接受這項概念,就永遠不會接受它.從來不曾見過任何人,會在十年之後才逐漸地叛依這種方法.它似乎和智商或學術無關,它是頓悟,否則就是拒絕.

Graham追求[價值遠超過價格的安全保障(邊際)(Margins of Safety],這種投資管理方法是否已經過時?目前,許多撰寫教科書的教授認為如此.他們認為,股票市場是有效率的市場;換言之,股票價格已經充分反應了公司一切已知的事實以及整體經濟情況.這些理論家認為,市場上沒有價格偏低的股票,因為聰明的證卷分析師將運用全部的既有資訊,以確保適當的價格.投資者能經年累月地擊敗市場,純粹是運氣使然.

Graham認為,股票市場大部份時間報價都不很合理,所以唯有投資人堅持:買進優良企業當其價格遠低於其價值時(即追求物美價廉),才是智慧型投資人值得採用的方法.因為當價格與低價值時,產生的報價緩衝(cushion)就是價值投資法的最大安全保障.

以上资料来自berkshire_taiwan.tripod.com/index.htm

10.11.13

股神投资精选


股神选股
打开巴菲特投资的公司名单,横跨美、亚洲,也像八爪章鱼般从零售、能源到金融、保险等,包括去年收购以色列ISCAR金属切割公司、浦项钢铁,在香港H股挂牌的中石油,可口可乐、美国运通、特易购、穆迪公司、WhiteMountains保险公司、富国银行、宝硷等。名单中不见这些年热门的高科技股。因为巴菲特从不投资自己不了解的企业,或者在他「竞争优势圈」(Circle of Competence)外的企业。他所谓的竞争优势圈,都是自己专精、乐于研究的产业。

  一:不做赔本生意

  「投资的第一法则,就是不要赔钱,第二法则是不要忘记第一法则,」这是巴菲特主义(Buffettism)最经典的一句话。巴菲特最大的成就,就是从一九六五年到二00六年,历经三个熊市,他掌理的波克夏只有在二00一年跌价过,(但当年依旧荣登SNP500)。

 投资
二:不要陷入盈馀迷思

  巴菲特判断一家公司财务的重点,并不是一般投资人关注的每股盈馀(EPS),而是「股东权益报酬率」(ROE)。巴菲特认为,EPS并不能说明什么,因为它无法反映股东过去投资了多少,然而股东们在一家公司投资愈多,公司盈馀应该要愈多。所以他选择以ROE衡量企业获利能力,也就是每个股东能分到多少公司的毛利。譬如巴菲特持有的可口可乐公司的股票,这家公司的ROE超过三○%、美国运通有三七%。

  三:判断未来发展性

  巴菲特迷封他为「奥马哈的先知」,不是没有道理的。他检测一家公司的体质,是看好它未来二十五年的发展性。巴菲特精算企业实质价值(intrinsic value),还有这些企业能否以显着的价值折扣购得。像巴菲特今年买进两家股票表现不佳的美国铁路公司Burlington Northern和Union Pacific,都是投资人不看好的公司。但这两家公司今年至今,股数分别增加了一八%和三四%。


 未来发展  四:专注有「护城河」的企业

  预测未来有风险性,因此巴菲特总是喜欢选择有宽广「经济护城河」(economic moat)的企业。他非常关注一家企业长期的竞争优势,藉此保障他的预测。这也说明为什么一九九0年代,巴菲特拒绝投入科技股,因为当时看不到哪家公司有足够宽广的护城河,「这超出我所了解的层面,」当时巴菲特并非如外界所言,刻意忽略科技股,而是他认为科技技术汰旧换新的速度太快,很多公司创造的竞争优势只有十八个月。

  五:要下筹码,就下大一点

  大多数价值型投资人,天性比较保守。根据美国晨星公司(Morningstar)追踪,平均这类基金经理人,将自己的筹码分散在一四六档不一样的股票。但是,这不是巴菲特的做法,股神将自己六十二亿美元的资金,集中投资在四十五家公司股票上。事实上,巴菲特投注在前十档股票的资金,占他投资组合的九成。「不要动不动就挥棒,如果要挥,在你的圈里挥,」他告诫过投资人。根据晨星公司统计,持有五十档以下股票的价值型股票基金,报酬率表现在过去三年到十五年的期间,比持有超过五十档股票的基金来得好。当然,筹码集中,风险自然高,投资人对自己的选择在未来的表现,必须有极度的自信。

 不要害怕  六:不要害怕等待

  如果你试图学巴菲特在股市大动作挥棒,你有很大的出局风险。巴菲特的法则是,「不要轻易挥棒,要挥棒也不要打到坏球」。他曾经引述美国红袜队强棒威廉斯(Ted Williams)的话,「当个好打者,你必须选好球来打」。遇到真正的好球前,巴菲特宁可紧握现金,也不轻易出手,「他比大多数的投资者都看得清楚,手上有大量现金,并不一定就会减损公司表现,现金是一种策略型资产,」纽泽西基金公司Fairholm Fund共同经理人波可维滋(Bruce Berkowitz)指出。事实上,现金部位占了波克夏投资配置中的一八%。这并不代表巴菲特不想投资获取更大的获利。他深信,「贪婪是好的」,但要有足够的耐性锻链贪婪,「你要在别人恐惧时展现贪婪,在别人展现贪婪时,你要恐惧」。


9.11.13

滚雪球的财富人生

湿雪,指的是在合适的环境中投入能不断滚动增长的资金。长坡,指的是能让资金有足够的时间滚大变强的企业。巴菲特也似乎总能找到“很湿的雪”和“很长的山坡”。

——《福布斯》
      在施罗德女士这本厚达900多页的书中,我们能够学到许多经验教训……从失败中汲取经验十分重要……许多人会说:下一次沃伦•巴菲特警告危机来临时,我们最好洗耳恭听。
——美国《商业周刊》
       这是一个典型的美国故事,讲述了一个完全靠自我奋斗而成功的人,并且在一些方面依然保持了自己的本色。这本书权威地展现了巴菲特非凡的一生,是所有资本家的《圣经》。

-巴菲特自己把他的成功归结为“专注”。施罗德写道:“他除了关注商业活动外,几乎对其他一切如艺术、文学、科学、旅行、建筑等全都充耳不闻——因此他能够专心致志追寻自己的激情。”

-大学毕业后,巴菲特被哈佛商学院拒绝,于是他来到哥伦比亚大学,投身名扬四海的本杰明•格林厄姆的门下,成为他的学生,这是《聪明的投资人》一书的作者,价值投资之父。巴菲特从格林厄姆那里明白了市场先生的危险,并且学会了如何抛开市场行情分析公司价值的秘诀。

-巴菲特的投资方法,源自格林厄姆,同时又有独创,十分简单:评估投资价值,规避风险,保留安全边际,让复利发挥实际功效。巴菲特只买自己能够理解和评估的股票,并且想在很便宜时买进。“任何人都明白这些简单的想法,”施罗德写道,“但是很少有人能够去实行。”

-在2008年春天的混乱之中,巴菲特在他近60年的职业生涯中,他所思考的价值和风险一直都没有改变,总是有人在说规则已经变了。但是,他说,只有短线投资,你才可以这么认为。

-除了天分之外,巴菲特还幸运地遇到了几位导师。一位是在哥伦比亚大学教过他的本杰明•格雷厄姆。从格雷厄姆那里他学到“市场先生是你的仆人,而非主人”。市场每天提供购买和出售股票的机会,但价格往往都没有意义。但偶尔它也提供低买高卖的机会。他的第二位导师是他第一任妻子苏珊,教了他如何跟人打交道。第三位是《华盛顿邮报》的女总裁凯瑟琳•格雷厄姆,她教会巴菲特社交生活不只有樱桃可口可乐与巧克力碎片冰淇淋。

-沃伦在用手接雪花。一开始是一次一片;接着,他把这些少量的雪积铲到一块,开始堆雪球。雪球变大之后,沃伦把它放到地上。雪球开始慢慢的滚动。沃伦每推动一次雪球,雪球就会沾上更多的雪。沃伦推着雪球滚过草坪,雪上加雪。很快,沃伦把雪球滚到院子边上。片刻犹豫之后,他继续向前,滚动雪球穿过附近的街区。

-艾丽丝说,在巴菲特的格言中,她最喜欢的是“紧张是优秀的代价”,还听到他说过“金钱加上勇气在危机时期是无价的”。

-晚年巴菲特变得慷慨了, 衡量成功的标准是真正爱你的人的数目。

他在全球金融风暴中亮丽的身影,至少给了我们这样几点启示:
一、在风暴中要有独特的投资视角。那就是明确了在危机中不必恐慌,不管全球风暴如何猖獗,但最终会过去的。如果往远处看,一定会有暴风雨过后的彩虹在等着我们。
二、在危机中要敢于捕捉机遇。1907年、1929年、1987年都曾发生过金融风暴,虽然股市都遭遇过暴跌,但最终还是复苏了,并出现了新的上升行情。 巴菲特在风暴中的身影告诉我们,当前股市的动荡,也许正是捕捉机遇的大好时机。
三、在熊市中要留有充足的现金。大笔买进、重拳出击。
四、在低位要寻找自己的“长坡”。 把握市场节奏的前提下,用自己熟悉的方式去投资。我们应根据自己的实际状况,在低位去寻找自己的“长坡”。

1999年年底的时候,即使是众多跟随巴菲特风格的长期“价值投资者”要么结束了自己的公司或业务,要么放弃了“价值投资”,买了IT类股票。但是,巴菲特没有这么做。“人们行事的一大问题在于,他们是否拥有‘内部记分卡’还是‘外部记分卡’。如果内部记分卡能令你感到满意,它将非常有用。我经常这么做的。我想说:‘听着。你想做世间最伟大的情人,却令大家认为你是世上最差劲的情人。或者,你想做世上最差劲的情人,但却让人们认为你是世间最伟大的情人。这两者之间,你做何选择?’恩,这是个有趣的问题。”
“还有另外一件有趣的事。如果全世界的人无视你的成果,那么,你是想被当作世间最伟大的投资者,但实际投资记录却是全世界最糟糕的投资者?还是愿意被认为是全世界最无能,而实际上却是最优秀的投资者?”

沃伦姐姐多丽丝被招募为自己合伙人买了城市服务公司的3股优先股,一共花了114.75美元。
那年6月份,市场向下击出低点。城市服务公司的优先股股价从38.25美元/股跳水到27美元/股。沃伦说,在上学的路上,多丽丝每天都“提醒”他,他的股票正在下跌。沃伦说他觉得责任压力大得可怕。因此,当股票最后回升的时候,他以40美元/股卖出,为他和多丽丝赚了5美元。“那个时候,我才了解到,沃伦知道自己在做什么。”多丽丝回忆说。不过,城市服务公司的股价很快就高涨到202美元/股。沃伦学到了三个教训,并把这段时期作为他一生中最重要的时期之一。第一个教训是,不要过分关注股票的买入成本。第二个教训是不要不动大脑的急于抓住蝇头小利。如果他能更耐心一点,他就能赚到492美元,他对此一直念念不忘,并由此吸收到上述两个教训。从他6岁开始,他干了5年活才积下120美元买了这只股票。以目前从出售高尔夫球,以及在棒球场贩卖爆米花和花生中赚到的钱为基准来计算,沃伦意识到,要把“丢失”的利润赚回来,那得用好多年。他将永远、永远、永远的记住这个错误。

这位全球第二富翁在进行捐赠的同时没有考虑为自己留下任何名利。他一生都在孜孜不倦地“滚雪球”,似乎是对自己人生的一种丰富;然而却没有建立什么沃伦•巴菲特基金会、巴菲特医院辅楼,没有一个大学奖学金或一座大楼冠以他的名字。进行捐赠的同时没有用自己的名字命名任何项目,没有对资金用向辅以个人意向——而是将资金放到了另一家基金会的金库中,而另一家基金会正是他权衡竞争实力和工作效率精心挑选的一家基金会;没有选择创造自己的慈善王国——彻底颠覆了传统的捐赠模式。此前没有哪位巨款捐赠人做出这样的壮举。“这是全球慈善史上历史性的一刻,”洛克菲勒慈善顾问机构的道格•鲍尔如是说,“他为别人进行慈善捐赠树立了榜样,推出了新的标准。”

品味非凡、成就不俗的沃伦•巴菲特过着简单的生活,他向来喜欢简单朴实的生活——一位妻子、一辆车子、一座房子多年没有翻新装修、经营一家公司、和家人在一起的时间越来越多。沃伦77岁生日的时候,思忖着自己走过的岁月已经长达美国建国时日的三分之一。毕竟年龄不饶人,像过去那样整天阅读已经越来越困难,一只眼睛视力有些下降,所以他开始保持高效阅读。他终究还是选择了助听器。他的声音比过去更加沙哑,而且身体容易疲劳,但是他的商业判断力依然敏锐。
他希望自己在未来十年依然可以象现在这样阅读每天送来的报纸。未来的时日已然不多,但或许可以有幸多活几年。
“只有找对了雪地才可以滚雪球,我就是这样做的。我所指的不仅仅是赚钱方面,在认识世界,结交朋友的时候同样如此。我们一生中要面临诸多选择,要争取做一个受欢迎的人,其实就是让自己的雪球在雪地上越滚越大,最好是一边前进一边选择积雪皑皑的地方,因为我们不会回到山顶重新开始滚雪球,生活正是如此。”
他精心滚起来的雪球现在已经非常之大,然而他对待滚雪球的态度依旧。不管度过多少个生日,日历每翻到那一天他都感叹不已,永远都会如此,他一直认为自己就是早晨八九点钟的太阳。他从不回望山顶。世界无限宽广,他才刚刚启程。

from http://lz.book.sohu.com/serialize-id-11504.html

31.10.13

巴菲特選股策略


-巴菲特認為唯一可靠的就是基本面。公司的核心產品、營收、獲利、經營團隊的能力與品德、處理現金的能力等,只有項項都過關,他才考慮買進。

-關心的是買到長期能成功和獲利的公司。雖然預測未來不可能全準,穩定的績效紀錄卻是相對可靠的指標。當一家公司年年在某項產品上做出同樣的成績時,認定這種成績可以持續下去並不為過。投資人著迷於明日的承諾,卻忽略了今天的事業真實。巴菲特說,「從穩定中獲利,我喜歡這樣。」經驗教他,反虧為盈常常反不過來。

-有持久競爭優勢的公司,往往不需將大部分保留盈餘用來維持營運;此處關鍵字是「維持」。理論上,企業的持久競爭優勢越大,越不需要花錢來維護。巴菲特眼中的完美企業,完全不必花錢維持競爭優勢,它們所賺的每一塊錢,都可作為股利或轉增資。

-了解一家公司是否具備持久競爭優勢,最好看它過去是否有買回自家股票的紀錄。公司若想長期進行股票買回,必須有充沛的閒置資金。具備持久競爭優勢的公司,有足夠的經濟實力長期執行股票買回。上市公司買回股票會使每股盈餘上升導致股價上揚,股東更富有。股票買回的神奇之處,是用公司資金提高股東持股比,自己卻不必花一分錢。

-如果人們因為表面上的理由做了投資而不是根據企業的基本面,那麼只要一出現不好的狀況就會被嚇跑,最後一定是賠錢。巴菲特則是對於考慮想買的事業盡可能去掌握狀況,集中注意力在三大領域:
一、這個事業簡單易懂嗎?
二、事業有長期經營的歷史嗎?
三、這個事業前景看好嗎?


-具持久競爭優勢的最佳指標,是當一家公司相對上沒有長期負債時。巴菲特發現,因為這類公司賺很多現金,因此對舉債的需求很小,甚至是零負債。大額長期負債令巴菲特不安,原因是負債削弱企業體質,而由於不景氣與利空事件經常使企業的獲利能力減弱,因而造成現金缺口,如果公司正好大量舉債(因此利息負擔沉重),可能使存續發生問題。銀行貸款給企業,是根據企業支付利息的能力,權益是確保債權的安全網,公司利用現金流量來償債的能力,遠比有多少資產作為負債的後盾更重要。測試公司財力的最佳方法,端視它以獲利來償債的能力。具備持久競爭優勢的公司獲利能力之強,以致能在幾年內就輕鬆還清長期負債,

26.10.13

筆名:冷眼, 大馬基本面大师


"40年的股票投資心得,自己保留並沒壞處;但和大家分享,幫助大家投資致富,卻是高興的事情:“我是水井,有人經過,想打一口水來解渴,這對水井沒有損害,對路人或許有幫助。” - 冷眼
分享的心得和策略,只是其中一種方法,並非全部的、唯一的方法。任何方法,包括圖表,只要對人有所幫助,都有其存在的道理。 ”
 然而,方法必須適合人的個性、想法、作風和價值觀,並且還要適合個人的財政狀況和年齡。惟有把所有的條件綜合起來,才能走出自己的道路。也因此,他豁達笑說:“每個人的方法不同,這就是何以世上沒有第二個巴菲特的原因!”
 世界500名最富有的人,都是靠經營某種事業成功而致富的,巴菲特是惟一“不事生產”,單靠股票投資而躋身世界500強者。他的財富僅次于世界首富比爾蓋茨。
學習任何技藝,可分兩個層面
 “研究巴菲特成功秘訣的書,少說也有一兩百種,模仿他的投資法的人,當不在少數。在美國,曾有不少基金經理,師法巴菲特之投資法,卻沒有聽說有哪一個基金,創造了如巴菲特般的輝煌業績。為什么?”他反問。
 “這是因為大師的方法,最適合他自己。實際上,學習任何技藝或從事任何事業,可以分為兩個層面:第一個層面是‘方法’,第二個層面是‘心法’。”
 所謂“方法”,以學習打拳為例,就是師父教導弟子的招數。‘方法’是基本的技術,一般資質的弟子都能學會。如果招數停留在‘方法’的層面,對方出招時才來想一想:我該用什么招數去應付?這肯定一敗塗地。
 “‘心法’是天分、領悟訓練及經驗的綜合體,要靠徒弟自動自發地摸索,長期不斷地練習,才有可能成功。熟到極點,心法自然水到渠成;股票投資亦如此。大家都知道低買高賣的好處,但何以那么多人賠本?這是因為多數人學習大師,還停留在‘方法’,沒有到達‘心法’。”
做回自己,不要盲目模仿別人
 馮時能特地援引莊子的小寓言指出,“燕國有位年輕人跑到趙國都城邯鄲,想學當地人優雅的走姿。他丟掉了自己的習慣走法,從頭學習邯鄲人的步法。他不但學不成,反而忘記本來走路方法,只好爬著回家。邯鄲學步,只能變成三不像。”
 他強調:“進行任何事業,誰都幫不到你。最重要的是:做回自己,不要盲目模仿別人,那么,你就能從學習大師的方法中,發展出一套適合個人水平的方法和哲理。”
了解概念學以致用
 從師父那裏學到方法后,又該如何發展心法?馮時能笑說:“生活裏的知識學問,最重要的概念,其實都是最基礎淺白的道理。所以,投資股票,首先,你一定要有正確的投資概念,即是:投資前,要反璞歸真回到最基本道理──股票是什么?”
 股票,就是公司的股份和票紙(證明書)。股票是有價證券,用來證明投資者在這間公司擁有多少股份,也代表他對這間公司的影響權利。舉例你參與了A公司10萬股中的一萬股,假如A公司賺10萬令吉,裏頭就有一萬令吉是屬于你的;並且,A公司的業務中,10%屬于你。
 “買股票就是和別人合股做生意。參股做生意都是為了賺錢。因此,你必須了解公司的生意基本面,包括公司的生意性質是什么?公司有賺錢嗎?有股息分嗎?財政穩健嗎?管理人老實又能幹嗎?然后,你再根據這些因素,做出投資決定。”
 “你要賺錢,就只能買有前途、能賺錢的公司股票。你要堅持一個信念:你的財富,必須有實際東西作后盾支持它。掌握了這樣的概念,你就可以發展出自己的投資哲理。”
只投資物有所值股票
 2009年金融風暴蹂躪下,全球股市滿目瘡痍。到底股市何時會跌至谷底?什么時候才是最好的買進時期?
 馮時能坦言,想要成功預測股市動向,這還是沒有人能做到的事情!因為誰都不知道世界幾時會發生大事,所以,歐債、日本海嘯和美國次貸風暴,才讓全球人類吃盡苦頭。
 “即便是大家看到的預測成功例子,這裏頭有很大的幸運成分在內。既然大事件都沒法預測,那么,想要企圖預測短期股市走勢,只是白費心機。無論如何,雖然無法預測未來股市走向,但還是可以根據經驗來基本判斷復蘇期限的長短。”
 1929年世界大蕭條,大國需要12年時間來恢復狀態;1998年的經濟衰退,大國則要3至5年來復蘇。到之前水平。美國次貸屬于大衰退,需要3年至5年來恢復元氣。
 “目前,大馬股市已相當高,好的股票也相當貴。相比2009年,今天要找有價值的股票已越來越難。然而,中低檔股票還是值得投資。建議大家,不要猜測股市起落,只要投資物有所值的股票,就能提防股市逆轉的困境。”
 投資者要學會不動如山,不要因為賠錢就馬上離場,也不要被過分樂觀的預言家麻醉想法。一定要用自己的眼光方法來判斷,然后做出正確反應。
何時買股票三原則
 何時該買股票?馮時能言簡意賅指出,根據3大原則:本益比(PE Ratio)、股息和公司健康狀況,來作出購買的決定。
 本益比要低,那么,投資者就可以在最少年賺回本錢。然后,股息要合理,最好是股息回酬比定期存款高一倍。最后,只要是健全而有成長的公司,都值得投資。
 “投資的程序是:有計劃、有知識地判斷公司的價值,再根據價值去投資。假如不做功課,不去了解公司,就貿然投資,這就叫投機。這等于閉著眼睛從山崖上跳下來。前面可能是萬丈深淵,投機者完全是博運氣,這跟賭博沒有兩樣。”
 他反復強調:股票投資致富正道,不靠運氣靠實力。所以,投資者一定要買物有所值的股票,千萬不要投機,因為投機是不可能創造財富的!人生要盡己所能,假如不做功課,造成投資失利,這就完全是自己招致的錯。
何時放手三訣竅
 至于何時該賣股票,馮時能表示:“做事業,你可以等3至5年;股票投資,你為什么不能等三五年?投資得利要長期持有股份,那么,賺的錢越多,分的紅也越多,最后達到投資致富目標。”
 至于何時該賣股票,他表示,請根據公司業績來判斷。“基本上,有三種情況要聰明放手,第一,股票估值太高,超過應有價值,值3令吉的股票賣5令吉,這最終還要看公司業績。”
 其次,公司虧錢要馬上退股。公司經營不好,再待下去就更糟,屆時虧本也賣不出。
 最后,找到更有價值的投資就放手。買A股,賺10仙;發現B股,賺20仙;當然是賣A來買B。
大马股市前辈 - "冷眼"

附属冷眼之前在南洋商報時所发表的部份文章做收尾。








21.9.13

Peter Lynch会购买的股票


"You don’t get hurt by things that you don’t own that go up. It’s what you do own that kills you."

"If I look at ten companies, I may find one company that is interesting. If I look at twenty companies then I may find two. If I look at forty, I may find four. If I look at one hundred, I may find ten."

The very best way to make money in a market is in a small growth company that has been profitable for a couple of years and simply goes on growing. 
I don’t even want to be in the position where I make one big decision. I’d like to make a couple of small decisions every day. 

You have to know when you’re wrong. Then you sell. Most stocks I buy are a mistake. 
"If you spend more than 13 minutes analyzing economic and market forecasts, you've wasted 10 minutes."

"Behind every stock is a company. Find out what it's doing."

"Owning stocks is like having children -- don't get involved with more than you can handle."

" If you can't find any companies that you think are attractive, put your money in the bank until you discover some."
" If you can follow only one bit of data, follow the earnings -- assuming the company in question has earnings. I subscribe to the crusty notion that sooner or later earnings make or break an investment in equities. What the stock price does today, tomorrow, or next week is only a distraction."

"Visiting stores and testing products is one of the critical elements of the analyst’s job."

" Investing in stocks is an art, not a science, and people who’ve been trained to rigidly quantify everything have a big disadvantage."

"In the long run, it's not just how much money you make that will determine your future prosperity. It's how much of that money you put to work by saving it and investing it."
" If a picture is worth a thousand words, in business, so is a number. The simpler it is, the better I like it."













此文仅供参考,是否合适因人而异。

彼得·林奇(Peter Lynch,1944年1月19日-),是一位股票投资家和证券投资基金经理。目前他是富达公司(Fidelity Investments)的副主席,富达基金托管人董事会成员之一,现居波士顿。
在彼得·林奇出任麦哲伦基金(Magellan Fund)的基金经理人的13年间,麦哲伦基金管理的资产由2,000万美元成长至140亿美元,基金投资人超过100万人,成为富达的旗舰基金,基金的年平均复利报酬率达29.2%。

Peter Lynch会购买的股票
1. 公司名字听起来枯燥乏味,甚至听起来很可笑则更好。(这种公司常常很少有人关注,不会成为热门股)
2. 公司业务枯燥乏味。(例如瓶盖瓶塞公司生产指导罐头盒和瓶塞,生产餐厅里用的塑料刀叉餐具的,还有比这跟乏味的业务吗?)
3.公司业务令人讨厌。(例如Safety-Kleen公司派人跑遍所有加油站,向他们提供一种清理汽车零件上沾的油污的机器,这种机器节省了修理工用手在装满汽油的桶中清晰零件的时间和精力,因而大家都很愿意买)
4. 公司从母公司中分拆出来。分拆出来的子公司常常具备十分良好的资产负债表,管理效率比较高。
5. 机构没有持股,分析师不追踪。
6. 公司被谣言包围:据说与有毒垃圾或者黑手党有关(有这些谣言时 大部分的投资者都不敢买,你可以去仔细研究。过去的赌博行业,夜总会等行业都是这样)。
7. 公司业务让人感到有些压抑。(最典型的代表就是SCI–一家总部位于休斯顿的丧葬服务公司)
8. 公司处于一个零增长的行业中。(如塑料小刀和小叉的行业,丧葬服务行业)
9. 公司占有一个缝隙市场。(例如在一个地区拥有一个石料场,基本上拥有了一种独家经营的权利)
10.人们要不断购买的产品。(例如软饮料,药品,剃须刀片等)
11. 公司是高科技产品的用户。(例如宁可购买使用扫描仪的大型超市股票,也不购买生产扫描仪的公司股票)。
12. 公司内部人士在不断买入自家公司的股票。
13. 公司在不断回购自家的股票。
当然,最好是集所有以上优点于一身的最佳公司(Peter的例子是Cajun清洁公司–Cajun Cleansers)
Peter Lynch避而不买的股票
1. 避开热门行业的热门股票。
2.小心那些被吹捧为“下一个”的公司 (下一个IBM, 下一个麦当劳,下一个Intel, ….. )
3.避开“多元恶化”的公司 (那些赢利不错的公司通常不是用赚来的钱回购股票或者提高分红,而是更喜欢把钱浪费在愚蠢的收购兼并上)
4. 当心“小声耳语”的股票。
5. 小心过于依赖于大客户的公司股票。
6. 小心名字花里胡哨的公司。

Peter Lynch
(born (1944-01-19)January 19, 1944) is an American businessman and stock investor. He is a research consultant at Fidelity Investments.
Investment philosophy (from wikipedia)
Lynch coined some of the best known mantras of modern individual investing strategies.
His most famous investment principle is simply, "Invest in what you know," popularizing the economic concept of "local knowledge". This simple principle resonates well with average non-professional investors who don't have time to learn complicated quantitative stock measures or read lengthy financial reports. Since most people tend to become expert in certain fields, applying this basic "invest in what you know" principle helps individual investors find good undervalued stocks.
Lynch uses this principle as a starting point for investors. He has also often said that the individual investor is more capable of making money from stocks than a fund manager, because they are able to spot good investments in their day-to-day lives before Wall Street. Throughout his two classic investment primers, he has outlined many of the investments he found when not in his office - he found them when he was out with his family, driving around or making a purchase at the mall. Lynch believes the individual investor is able to do this, too.
He also coined the phrase "ten bagger" in a financial context. This refers to an investment which is worth ten times its original purchase price and comes from baseball where "bags" or "bases" that a runner reaches are the measure of the success of a play. A "two bagger" would be a double, so by extension, two home runs and a double would be a "ten bagger".

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
from pbs.org
QHow did you first get interested in the stock market.

A
Well, I grew up in the 1950s. I started caddying when I was 11. So the PETER Lynchwould have been 1955 and in that part -- the '50s were a great decade for the stock market. I caddied a very nice club out in west Newton, had a lot of people, corporate executives, and some of these were buying stocks and I remember them talking about stocks and they mentioned the names and I'd look in the paper and look at it a month later, a year later, and I noticed they were goin' up. And I said, "Gee, this makes a lot of sense." And so I watched it. I didn't have any money to invest, but I remember the stock market being very strong in the 1950s and some people, not everybody, but a lot of people on the golf course talking about it.

QWhat was your first stock?

A
Well, when I got a caddie scholarship to college. It was actually a partial scholarship, a Frances Wimen Scholarship, a financial aid scholarship, but it was thousand dollars to go to Boston College and they gave me a $300 scholarship and I got to earn over $700 a year caddying. So I was able to build up a little bit of money and I worked also during the winters. So while I was in college I did a little study on the freight industry, the air freight industry. And I looked at this company called Flying Tiger. And I actually put a thousand dollars in it and I remember I thought this air cargo was going to be a thing of the future. And I bought it and it got really lucky because it went up for another reason. The Vietnam War started and they basically hauled a lot of troops to Vietnam in airplanes and the stock went up, I think, nine- or ten-fold and I had my first ten bagger. I started selling it, I think, at 20 and 30 and 40, sold all the way up to 80 and helped pay for graduate school. So I almost had a Flying Tiger graduate school fellowship.

QYou originated the expression "four bagger", "five bagger" et cetera. What's that mean exactly?

A
I've always been a great lover of baseball. I mean if you grew up in Boston, you know that the last time we won the World Series, Babe Ruth pitched for us. It was 1918. So it's been a long drought here. So I've always loved baseball and the ten bagger is two home-runs and a double. It's you run around a lot, so it's very exciting.

A
You made ten times your money. Is a ten bagger.

QThat's pretty good.

A
Excellent. You don't need a lot in your lifetime. You only need a few good stocks in your lifetime. I mean how many times do you need a stock to go up ten-fold to make a lot of money? Not a lot.

QWas that your secret?

A
Well, I think the secret is if you have a lot of stocks, some will do mediocre, some will do okay, and if one of two of 'em go up big time, you produce a fabulous result. And I think that's the promise to some people. Some stocks go up 20-30 percent and they get rid of it and they hold onto the dogs. And it's sort of like watering the weeds and cutting out the flowers. You want to let the winners run. When the fun ones get better, add to 'em, and that one winner, you basically see a few stocks in your lifetime, that's all you need. I mean stocks are out there. When I ran Magellan, I wrote a book. I think I listed over a hundred stocks that went up over ten-fold when I ran Magellan and I owned thousands of stocks. I owned none of these stocks. I missed every one of these stocks that went up over ten-fold. I didn't own a share of them. And I still managed to do well with Magellan. So there's lots of stocks out there and all you need is a few of 'em. So that's been my philosophy. You have to let the big ones make up for your mistakes.
In this business if you're good, you're right six times out of ten. You're never going to be right nine times out of ten. This is not like pure science where you go, "Aha" and you've got the answer. By the time you've got "Aha," Chrysler's already quadrupled or Boeing's quadrupled. You have to take a little bit of risk.

QWhen you first went to Fidelity, what was the market like?

A
Well, after the great rush of the '50s, the market did brilliantly and everybody says, "Wow, looking backwards, this would be a great time to get in." So a lot of people got in in the early '60s and in the mid-60s. The market peaked in '65-66 around a thousand, and that's when I came. I was a summer student at Fidelity in 1966. There were 75 applicants for three jobs at Fidelity, but I caddied for the president for eight years. So that was the only job interview I ever took. It was sort of a rigged deal, I think. I worked there the summer of '66 and I remember the market was close to a thousand in 1966, and in 1982, 16 years later, it was 777. So we had a long drought after that. So the people were concerned about the stock market early in the '50s. They kept watching and watching, not investing. It started to go up dramatically and they finally caved in and bought big time in the mid-60s and got the peak.

QSo people got in at the wrong time, in effect?

A
A lot of people got in at the wrong time. A lot of people did very well and some people said, "This is it. I'll never get back in again." And they maybe meant it, but they probably got back in again anyway.

QHow much did you make on your first job at Fidelity?

A
I was paid, $16,000 a year. I was an analyst. I was the textile analyst, the metals analysts, and I remember the second year I got a raise to $17,000. That was great, you know.

QDid you get other job offers?

A
I was in ROTC studies, I spent two years in the Army and I did two years of graduate school and in, a business at Wharton School of Finance, University of Pennsylvania. So I was about 25 when I joined Fidelity.

QHow old were you when you took over Magellan?

A
That was 1977, so I guess I was 33.

QWhat kind of fund was Magellan?

A
It was a small aggressive capital appreciation fund. Magellan Fund basically started in the early '60s. In the name, it was an international fund, but right after it started in 1963, they put sort of a barrier and a heavy tax on foreign investing. So it did very little foreign investing. It had the ability to do it, but there was very little interest then. There was a big penalty. So even though it was Magellan Fund, it was primarily a domestic fund. And when I took over in May of 1977, the fund was $20 million.

QAnd that was your first portfolio managing job?

A
That's correct. I was director research in 1974. I still continued to be an analyst, and then May of 1977 I took over Magellan Fund.

QBut the market really didn't do much between '77 and '82, between the beginning of that bull market, and yet your fund performed quite spectacularly. What do you do?

A
Well, I think flexibility is one of the key things. I mean I would buy companies that had unions. I would buy companies that were in the steel industry. I'd buy textile companies. I always thought there was good opportunities everywhere and, researched my stocks myself. I mean Taco Bell was one of my first stock I bought. I mean the people wouldn't look at a small restaurant company. So I think it was just looking at different companies and I always thought if you looked at ten companies, you'd find one that's interesting, if you'd look at 20, you'd find two, or if you look at hundred you'll find ten. The person that turns over the most rocks wins the game. And that's always been my philosophy.

QHow did Magellan begin to make a name for itself in '82?

A
Well, the first three years I ran Magellan, I think one-third of the shares were redeemed. I mean there was very little interest. People didn't care. The market was doing okay and Magellan was doing well, but people were sort of recovering from their losses, so they from the '50s and '60s, and so literally one-third of the shares were redeemed the first three years I ran it. And in 1982, the market started to pick up. It bought 'em in August of '82, and from then on a lot of interest came back in the market in '83 and '84. Magellan had the best five-year record in 1982 and the best five-year record in 1983 and people tend to look, the press and the media and the newspapers, tend to look at who's had a good record and Magellan was there.

QTell about the first time you were on Ruckeyser.

A
Well, 1982, I think it was the market had just gone over a thousand maybe a week or two before that. So this would have been, I think, October of '82 and Chrysler was my biggest position and the stock, I think, was 10 and I recommended Chrysler and I remember I had, ah -- I had people who said, "Gee, we thought you were interesting." These were relatives of mine. "But how could you ever recommend Chrysler? Don't you know they're going bankrupt?" I remember friends of mine and relatives saying, "That sound crazy to me." So it worked out fine.
And amazing. I think I was on "Wall Street with Louis Ruckheyser" in 1990 and Chrysler was 10 again. It had a stock split that had gone all the way down to 10 and I recommended it again in October of 1990 on "Wall Street with Louis Ruckeyser".

QChart the growth of the fund in the '80s, just for chronology.

A
Well, the fund was not very big in 1982, even though I had ran it for five years. And in '80-- end of '82 when the market really started to come in and people started to look to the future, I think it was April of '83 it passed one billion. That was a big number. I remember that number has a lot of zeros and it's kind of a magic number. So I remember that point and people just continued to be interested in the market and these were lots of individuals coming. This was not people putting in four million at the time or three million. It was lots of two-, and three- and five-thousand-investments coming in. And it was steady. It wasn't a torrent. It just was there every day.

QWas it becoming more famous? Wasn't it on "Jeopardy", for instance?

A
Yeah. At some point in time I remember -- I didn't watch the show. I always liked "Jeopardy", but I remember my wife watched the show and somebody was saying "What's the fund that was named after an explorer." And all the people, they all hit the button at the same time on "Jeopardy" and they knew it was Magellan. So, I guess it became more famous then, but there wasn't that much coverage. I mean today I think The Wall Street Journal has three full-time reporters covering the mutual fund industry. They had none in the early '80s. So the coverage was really basically Wall Street, Louis Ruckheyser, Barron's, a little bit in The New York Times every quarter. There was not coverage of the mutual fund industry. It was really coverage of stocks. And, you know, occasionally, ah, Forbes or Fortune or a periodical would write an article, but there wasn't very much interest even in the '80s.

QWhat caused that to change?

A
Well, I think the great decade of the '80s and people thinking that, you know, "There's a lot of publicity on the Social Security System not gonna make it," and a lot of pension plans. I mean people used to retire and they'd say, "Right now I'm going to get half my last year's salary for the rest of my life, or 60 percent. I don't have to worry about it." Now a lot of people are given their entire pension plan, the most important financial asset they ever got, and they said, "Okay, sweetheart, it's yours. Take care of it." Or there's no pension plan. So today people have to think about their future. They're worried about Social Security and they may have to do their own pension or they already have been given their pension and say, "You manage it." So I think there's -- you have to become finally literate today.

QWas your success part of reason why the press, et cetera, began to look at mutual funds more carefully?

A
Well, I think the fact the fund went up, I mean that was the key. If I'd had gone down, I'd have had to dye my hair and grow a beard and move to Fiji. It was just the fact it went up, people made a lot of money and there was a lot of word-of-mouth. I mean it was people saying that "Investing is good," and "We should put some of our money aside and put so much in quarterly." And I think the IRA was invented and there was a lot of things that were to encourage people to save.

If had put a thousand dollars in Magellan on the day you took it over, how much would I have reaped on the day you retired?

Well, if somebody invested a thousand dollars in Magellan on May 31st, 1977, the day I left, the thousand would have been $28,000, --May 31st 13 years later, 1990.

QTalk about the change in '86-87.

A
Well, I remember in my career you'd say to somebody you worked in the investment business. They'd say, "That's interesting. Do you sail? What do you think of the Celtics?" I mean it would just go right to the next subject. If you told them you were a prison guard, they would have been interested. They would have had some interest in that subject, but if you said you were in the investment business, they said, "Oh, terrific. Do your children go to school?" It just went right to the next subject. You could have been a leper, you know, and been much more interesting. So that was sort of the attitude in the '60s and '70s.
As the market started to heat up, you'd say you were an investor, "Oh, that's interesting. Are there any stocks you're buying?" And then people would listen not avidly. They'd think about it. But then as the '80s piled on, they started writing things down. So I remember people would really take an interest if you were in the investment business, saying "What do you like?" And then it turned and I remember the final page of the chapter would be you'd be at a party and everybody would be talking about stocks. And then people would recommend stocks to me. And then I remember not only that, but the stocks would go up. I'd look in the paper and I'd notice they'd go up in the next three months. And then you've done the full cycle of the speculative cycle that people hate stocks, they despised, they don't want to hear anything about 'em, now they're buying everything and cab drivers are recommending stocks. So that was sort of the cycle I remember going through from the '60s and early '70s all the way to '87.

QWhere were you when the Crash of '87 came?

A
Well, I was very well prepared for the Crash of 1987. -- my wife and I took our first vacation in eight years and we left on Thursday in October and I think that day the market went down 55 points and we went to Ireland, the first trip we'd ever been there. And then on Friday, because of the time difference, we'd almost completed the day and I called and the market was down 115. I said to Carolyn, "If the market goes down on Monday, we'd better go home." And "We're already here for the weekend. So we'll spend the weekend." So it went down 508 on Monday, so I went home. So in two business days I had lost a third of my fund. So I figured at that rate, the week would have been a rough week. So I went home. Like I could do something about it. I mean it's like, you know, if there was something I could do. I mean there I was -- but I think if people called up and they said, "What's Lynch doing," and they said, "Well, he's on the eighth hole and he's every par so far, but he's in a trap, this could be a triple bogey," I mean I think that's not what they wanted to hear. I think they wanted to hear I'd be there lookin' over -- I mean there's not a lot you can do when the market's in a cascade but I got home quick as I could.

QWhy did the Crash of '87 happen?

A
Well, I think people had not analyzed '87 very well. I think you really have to put it in perspective. 1982, the market's 777. It's all the way to '86. You have the move to 1700. In four years -- the market moves from 777 to 1700 in four years. Then in none months it puts on a thousand points. So it puts on a thousand points in four years, then puts on another thousand points in the next nine months. So in August of 1987 it's 2700. It's gone up a thousand points in nine months. Then it falls a thousand points in two months, 500 points the last day. So if the market got sideways at 1700, no one would have worried, but it went up a thousand in nine-ten months and then a thousand in two months, and half of it in one day, you would have said.... "The world's over." It was the same price. So it was really a question of the market just kept going up and up and it just went to such an incredible high price by historic, price earnings multiple load, dividend yields, all the other statistics, but people forget that basically it was unchanged in 12 months. If you looked at September, 1986 to October '87, the market was unchanged. It had a thousand point up and a thousand points down and they only remember the down. They thought, "Oh, my goodness, this is the crash. It's all over. It's going to go to 200 and I'm going to selling apples and pencils," you know. But it wasn't. It was a very unique phenomenon because companies were doing fine. Just, you know, you'd call up a company and say, "We can't figure it out. We're doin' well. Our orders are good. Our balance sheet's good." "We just announced we're gonna buy some of our stock. We can't figure out why it's good down so much."

QWas that the most scared you ever were in your career?

A
'87 wasn't that scary because I concentrate on fundamentals. I call up companies. I look at their balance sheet. I look at their business. I look at the environment. The decline was kinda scary and you'd tell yourself, "Will this infect the basic consumer? Will this drop make people stop buying cars, stop buying houses, stop buying appliances, stop going to restaurants?" And you worried about that.
The reality, the '87 decline was nothing like 1990. Ninety, in my 30 years of watching stock very carefully, was by far the scariest period.

QWhat was so scary about 1990?

A
Well, 1990 was a situation where I think it's almost exactly six years ago approximately now. In the summer of 1990, the market's around 3000. Economy's doing okay. And Saddam Hussein decides to walk in and invade Kuwait. So we have invasion of Kuwait and President Bush sends 500,000 troops to Saudi to protect Saudi Arabia. There's a very big concern about, you know, "Are we going to have another Vietnam War?" A lot of serious military people said, "This is going to be a terrible war." Iraq has the fourth largest army in the world. They really fought very well against Iran. These people are tough. This is going to be a long, awful thing. So people were very concerned about that, but, in addition, we had a very major banking crisis. All the major New York City banks, Bank America, the real cornerstone of this country were really in trouble. And this is a lot different than if W.T. Grant went under or Penn Central went under. Banking is really tight. And you had to hope that the banking system would hold together and that the Federal Reserve understood that Citicorp, Chase, Chemical, Manufacturers Hanover, Bank of America were very important to this country and that they would survive. And then we had a recession. Unlike '87 you called companies, in 1990 you called companies and say, "Gee, our business is startin' to slip. Inventories are startin' to pile up. We're not doing that well." So you really at that point in time had to belief the whole thing would hold together, that we wouldn't have a major war. You really had to have faith in the future of this country in 1990. In '87, the fundamentals were terrific and it was -- it was like one of those three for two sales at the K-Mart. Things were marked down. It was the same story.

QIs there so much pressure because you're handling so much money for other people?

A
It wasn't the pressure. I loved the job. I mean I worked for the best company in the world. I get paid extremely well. We had free coffee. I mean it's a great place to work. I could see any company I wanted to see. I didn't have to, say, get permission to go visit companies I California or Indiana. I just -- lot of freedom, a lot of responsibility. The pressure wasn't it. It was just too much time. I was working six days a week and that wasn't even enough.

QWere you surprised by the outpouring in the wake of your retirement?

A
I was really shocked at people's response and all the networks and news overseas and all around the world that it was such a big deal. I mean I was amazed by it. I could write five letters a day for the next seven years to get back to the people that wrote thanking me or wishing me the best and literally maybe my secretary screened me from the nasty ones, but I don't remember anybody saying, "You god. I just got in yesterday and you left." I mean there were all these very nice notes saying, "You're doing the right thing. I'm very happy about it," and ...

QTell the story about your wife stumbling on a big stock for you in the supermarket.

A
I had a great luck company called Hanes. They test marketed a product called L'Eggs in Boston and I think in Columbus, Ohio, maybe three or four markets. And Carolyn, ah, brought this product home and she was buying and she said, "It's great." And she almost got a black belt in shopping. She's a very good shopper. If we hadn't had these three kids, she now -- when Beth finally goes off to college, I think we'll be able to resume her training. But she's a very good shopper and she would buy these things. She said, "They're really great." And I did a little bit of research. I found out the average woman goes to the supermarket or a drugstore once a week. And they go a woman's specialty store or department store once every six weeks. And all the good hosiery, all the good pantyhose is being sold in department stores. They were selling junk in the supermarkets. They were selling junk in the drugstores. So this company came up with a product. They rack-jobbed it, they had all the sizes, all the fits, a down they never advertised price. They just advertised "This fits. You'll enjoy it." And it was a huge success and it became my biggest position and I always worried somebody'd come out with a competitive product, and about a year-and-a-half they were on the market another large company called Kaiser-Roth came out with a product called No Nonsense. They put it right next to L'eggs in the supermarket, right next to L'eggs in the drugstore. I said, "Wow, I gotta figure this one out." So I remember buying -- I bought 48 different pairs at the supermarket, colors, shapes, and sizes. They must have wondered what kind of house I had at home when I got to the register. They just let me buy it. So I brought it into the office. I gave it to everybody. I said, "Try this out and come back and see what's the story with No Nonsense." And people came back to me in a couple weeks and said, "It's not as good." That's what fundamental research is. So I held onto Hanes and it was a huge stock and it was bought out by Consolidated Foods, which is now called Sara Lee, and it's been a great division of that company. It might have been a thirty bagger instead of a ten bagger, if it hadn't been bought out.

QThe beginning of the bull market in 1982 and the environment. Were you surprised?

A
1982 was a very scary period for this country. We've had nine recessions since World War II. This was the worst. 14 percent inflation. We had a 20 percent prime rate, 15 percent long governments. It was ugly. And the economy was really much in a free-fall and people were really worried, "Is this it? Has the American economy had it? Are we going to be able to control inflation?" I mean there was a lot of very uncertain times. You had to say to yourself, "I believe it in. I believe in stocks. I believe in companies. I believe they can control this. And this is an anomaly. Double-digit inflation is rare thing. Doesn't happen very often. And, in fact, one of my shareholders wrote me and said, "Do you realize that over half the companies in your portfolio are losing money right now?" I looked up, he was right, or she was right. But I was ready. I mean I said, "These companies are going to do well once the economy comes back. We've got out of every other recession. I don't see why we won't come out of this one." And it came out and once we came back, the market went north.

QNobody told you it was coming.

A
It's lovely to know when there's recession. I don't remember anybody predicting 1982 we're going to have 14 percent inflation, 12 percent unemployment, a 20 percent prime rate, you know, the worst recession since the Depression. I don't remember any of that being predicted. It just happened. It was there. It was ugly. And I don't remember anybody telling me about it. So I don't worry about any of that stuff. I've always said if you spend 13 minutes a year on economics, you've wasted 10 minutes.

QSo what should people think about?

A
Well, they should think about what's happening. I'm talking about economics as forecasting the future. If you own auto stocks you ought to be very interested in used car prices. If you own aluminum companies you ought to be interested in what's happened to inventories of aluminum. If your stock are hotels, you ought to be interested in how many people are building hotels. These are facts. People talk about what's going to happen in the future, that the average recession last .2 years or who knows? There's no reason why we can't have an average economic expansion that lasts longer. I mean I deal in facts, not forecasting the future. That's crystal ball stuff. That doesn't work. Futile.

QTalk about going from one to five to ten billion and whether people thought it was getting too big.

A
Sure. I certainly remember when Magellan passed the billion. I remember it was sometime in 1983 and then remember I think in '84, I don't remember exactly when it became the largest fund in the country, and people said, "Magellan's too big at a billion to get in, to get out. It's hopeless. Leave." And then when it became a largest fund, "It's obviously too big now." And then it got to five billion, they said, "Forget it." When it got to ten billion, they said, "Forget it." And I'd always say, "If I could beat the market by three or four percent a year I'm really doing a service to the public." And then after I left, they said, "The fund's too big. Forget it." And, ah, Magellan's done extremely well in the six years since I left it. It's beaten the market. It's beaten 80 percent of all funds. So I mean I hope they keep warning people to stay away from it. It's been a terrific thing for it.

QCan the little guy play with the big guy in the stock market?

A
There's always been this position that the small investor has no chance against the big institutions. And I always wonder whether that's the person under four-foot-eight. I mean they always said the small investor doesn't have a chance. And there's two issues there. First of all, I think that he or she can do it, but, number two, the question is, people do it anyway. They invest anyway. And if they so believe this theory that the small investor has no chance, they invest in a different format. They said, "This is a casino. I'll buy stock this month. I'll sell it a month later," same kind of performance that they do everywhere. When they look at a house, they're very careful. They look at the school system. They look at the street. They look at the plumbing. When they buy a refrigerator, they do homework. If they're so convinced that the small investor has no chance, the stock market's a big game and they act accordingly, they hear a stock and they buy it before sunset, they're going to get the kind of results that prove the small investor can do poorly. Now if you buy a -- you make a mistake on a car, you make a mistake on a house, you don't blame the professional investors. But now if you do stupid research, you buy some company that has no sales, no earnings, a terrible financial position and it goes down, you say, "Well, it because of the programmed trading of those professionals," that's because you didn't do your homework. So I -- I've tried to convince people they can do a job, they can do very well, but they have to do certain things.

QWouldn't one of those things be letting you do it for them?

A
Well, the small investor can do three things. They can avoid the market entirely. They can just say, ah, "I can't stand it. It's too volatile for me. I'll just put my money in money market funds or put my money in the bank." That's one choice. The other choice is they can invest directly in the stock market by buying stocks individually, or they can buy mutual funds and invest in stock. I think they can do the course of investing in mutual funds and every now and then, they find some stocks, they have a chance the make a big hit. I think the average person could know three or four or five companies very well. They could lecture on those three or four or five companies, and if one or two of 'em becomes attractive, they buy 'em. They just can't wake up in the morning and say, "Now's the time to buy this. Now's the time to buy IBM. Now's the time to by GE. Now's the time to buy Dow Chemical. Now's the time to buy some biotechnology company," if they don't know something about it. You have to know the story. And people have lots of edges and they throw them away.

QTalk about market timing.

A
The market itself is very volatile. We've had 95 years completed this century. We're in the middle of 1996 and we're close to a 10 percent decline. In the 95 years so far, we've had 53 declines in the market of 10 percent or more. Not 53 down years. The market might have been up 26 finished the year up four, and had a 10 percent correction. So we've had 53 declines in 95 years. That's once every two years. Of the 53, 15 of the 53 have been 25 percent or more. That's a bear market. So 15 in 95 years, about once every six years you're going to have a big decline. Now no one seems to know when there are gonna happen. At least if they know about 'em, they're not telling anybody about 'em. I don't remember anybody predicting the market right more than once, and they predict a lot. So they're gonna happen. If you're in the market, you have to know there's going to be declines. And they're going to cap and every couple of years you're going to get a 10 percent correction. That's a euphemism for losing a lot of money rapidly. That's what a "correction" is called. And a bear market is 20-25-30 percent decline. They're gonna happen. When they're gonna start, no one knows. If you're not ready for that, you shouldn't be in the stock market. I mean stomach is the key organ here. It's not the brain. Do you have the stomach for these kind of declines? And what's your timing like? Is your horizon one year? Is your horizon ten years or 20 years? If you've been lucky enough to save up lots of money and you're about to send one kid to college and your child's starting a year from now, you decide to invest in stocks directly or with a mutual fund with a one-year horizon or a two-year horizon, that's silly. That's just like betting on red or black at the casino. What the market's going to do in one or two years, you don't know. Time is on your side in the stock market. It's on your side. And when stocks go down, if you've got the money, you don't worry about it and you're putting more in, you shouldn't worry about it. You should worry what are stocks going to be 10 years from now, 20 years from now, 30 years from now. I'm very confident.

QIf you had invested in '66, it would have taken 15 years to make the money back.

A
Well, from '66 to 1982, the market basically was flat. But you still had dividends in stocks. You still had a positive return. You made a few percent a year. That was the worst period other than the 1920s, in this century. So companies still pay dividends, even though if their stock goes sideways for ten years, they continue to pay you dividends, they continue to raise their dividends. So you have to say the yourself, "What are corporate profits going to do?" Historically, corporate profits have grown about eight percent a year. Eight percent a year. They double every nine years. They quadruple every 18. They go up six-fold every 25 years. So guess what? In the last 25 years corporate profits have gone up a little over six-fold, the stock market's gone up a little bit over six-fold, and you've had a two or three percent dividend yield, you've made about 11 percent a year. There's an incredible correlation over time.
So you have to say to yourself, "What's gonna happen in the next 10-20-30 years? Do I think the General Electrics, the Sears, the Wal-Marts, the MicroSofts, the Mercks, the Johnson & Johnsons, the Gillettes, Anheiser-Busch, are they going to be making more money 10 years from now, 20 years from now? I think they will." Will new companies come along like Federal Express that came along in the last 20 years? Will new companies come along like Amgen that make money? Will new companies come along like Compaq Computer? I think they will. There'll be new companies coming along that make money. That's what you're investing in.

QYou believe that the majority of small investors had lost money and that's why they're in mutual funds?

A
I wrote three books and I had great help with doing it with John Rothschild, is I really want to help the average person. My wife and I have given all the profits from those books to charity. I want to help people do a better job investing, understand the market because what amazes me is we've had this phenomenal market. You start 1982, August of '82, the market's 777. In May of 1996, it's at 5700. I'm that's up almost seven-fold. That's an incredible advance. Now how come there's not a lot more people buyin' stocks? How come the number of registered shareholders hasn't gone up dramatically? When antiques were hot, lots of who were doin' antiques. When rugs were hot, they were doin' rugs. When baseball cards were in, thousands of people were into baseball cards, tens of thousands. And people were fixin' up old cars. The only thing I can conclude from the fact there hasn't been a great jump in the amount of people directly investing in the stock market has been in this best bull market of all time, August of '82 to 19-- May of '96, best stock market ever, people must have done a mediocre job or they would be doing more of it themselves and they'd be telling their friends about it and their friends'd be doing it. So their method must be flawed.

QWhat does that say to you about their frame of mind?

A
Well, for some reason, the public looks at stocks differently than they look at everything else. When they buy a refrigerator, they do research. When they buy a microwave oven, they do research. They'll get Consumer Reports. They'll ask a customer "What's your favorite kind of oven? What kind of car would you buy?" Then they'll -- they'll put $10,000 in some zany stock that they don't even know what it does that they heard on a bus on the way to work and wonder why they lose money, and they do it before sunset. Well, you've got plenty of time. You could have bought Wal-Mart ten years after it went public -- Wal-Mart went public in 1970. You could have bought it ten years later and made 30 times your money. You could have said, "I'm very cautious. I'm very careful. I'm gonna wait. I want to make sure this company -- they're just in Arkansas and I want to watch 'em go to other states." So you watch, five years later the stock's up about four-fold. You say, "I'm still not sure of this company. They have a great balance sheet, great record." I'm going to wait another -- wait another five years, it goes up another four-fold. It's now up twenty-fold. You still haven't invested. You say, "Now I think it's time to invest in Wal-Mart." You still could have made 30 times your money because ten years after Wal-Mart went public they were only in 15 percent of the United States. They hadn't saturated that 15 percent and they were very low cost. They were in small towns. You could say to yourself, "Why can't they go to 17? Why can't they go to 19? Why can't they go to 21? I'll get on the computer. Why can't they go to 28?" And that's all they did. They just replicated their formula. That doesn't take a lot of courage. That's homework.

QThe high and the low analysis.

A
People spend all this time trying to figure out "What time of the year should I make an investment? When should I invest?" And it's such a waste of time. It's so futile. I did a great study, it's an amazing exercise. In the 30 years, 1965 to 1995, if you had invested a thousand dollars, you had incredible good luck, you invested a the low of the year, you picked the low day of the year, you put your thousand dollars in, your return would have been 11.7 compounded. Now some poor unlucky soul, the Jackie Gleason of the world, put in the high of the year. He or she picked the high of the year, put their thousand dollars in at the peak every single time, miserable record, 30 years in a row, picked the high of the year. Their return was 10.6 That's the only difference between the high of the year and the low of the year. Some other person put in the first day of the year, their return was 11.0. I mean the odds of that are very little, but people spend an unbelievable amount of mental energy trying to pick what the market's going to do, what time of the year to buy it. It's just not worth it.

QSo they just buy and hold?

A
They should buy, hold, and when the market goes down, add to it. Every time the market goes down 10 percent, you add to it, you'd be much -- you would have better return than the average of 11 percent, if you believe in it, if it's money you're not worried about. As the market starts going down, you say, "Oh, it'll be fine. It'll be predictable." When it starts going down and people get laid off, a friend of yours, loses their job or a company has 10,000 employees and they lay off two. The other 998,000 people start to worry or somebody says their house price just went down, these are little thoughts that start to creep to the front of your brain. And they're the back of your brain. And human nature hasn't changed much in 5,000 years. There's this thing of greed versus fear. The market's going up, you're not worried. All of a sudden it starts going down and you start saying, "I remember my uncle told me, you know, somebody lost it all in the Depression. People were jumping out of windows. They were selling pencils and apples." It must have been a great decade to buy a pencil or an apple, but they were always -- there must have been everybody selling pencils. That start to -- we laugh about it. People start to think about these things with the market going down. These ugly thoughts start coming into the picture. Gotta get 'em out. You have to wipe those out and you -- you either believe in it or you don't.

QThe fact of the matter is, in the America that we live in, there are a lot of people who feel they have no choice, that they have to be in the market. What do those people do?

A
Well, if people don't have the stomach, they really don't have it, the volatility's too much for them with the stock market, they can avoid it. They could buy money market funds and they'd get a little bit better than inflation. They will not get, in my opinion, the same return the next 20 years, the next 30 years they would get by buying stocks. That doesn't sound like much, but over the long period of time Treasury Bills and money markets have yielded a little bit higher than inflation, bonds have yielded five or six percent, and stocks have yielded a total of 11. The differences are massive over 30 years, but that's not a bad return to get a positive return. If you're worried, it's better than losing money.

QHow do those people educate their kids and retire?

A
They have to save more. The public's not saving enough. Our whole system's all backwards. If you borrow money to spend, add addition to your house, it's tax deductible, you save money, they tax you on it. I mean the public has figured out very well there's no inducement to save. Our system is very confusing. We have the highest capital gains rate in the history of this country right now. The capital gains rates in Japan is zero. They have a 20 percent savings rate in Japan. We have to have a higher savings rate. No one's encouraging savings. And it's the one thing I remember from college is savings equals investment. For every savings of a dollar, money goes into capital investment, that yields more productivity, yields more jobs, yields better standard of living. We are not saving enough money. That's the most single important thing people have to do, they have to save some more.

QWith so many people investing in mutual funds, let's consider two issues. Short-term profit....long-term stability?

A
Well, if corporate management's job is to make the company deal well and make a good job for employees, provide a good service, they know if they do something very slick, very fast and it works well for three months, their competitors will knock 'em off. They have to come out with a better product. They have to come out with better services. So I think the real issue is they have to think long-term and they're doing that. They have to say, "We have to stay competitive and we have to think about ways -- we just introduced a me-too product. That's not enough. It has to be a better product." And I think that's been the difference. "Can we lower our costs?" You see that with the telephone companies. You see it with electric utilities. You see it with broadcasting. You see it with gas companies, industries that never even thought of this -- publishing, just throughout all of the America in the retailing industry, better ways of delivering products. And it's a serious effort and it's a long-term effort. And they're trying to spend more and more time to say, "How can we do a better job? We just can't raise prices. That game's over."

QSo companies get a bad rap for this short-term, long-term business?

A
Well, there is a group of people that buy companies, sell this division, sell that division, sell that off and divide it up and that's a very small minority. It doesn't happen very often. And they used to be able to use junk bonds. That day's over. They used to get a lot of money from the banking system to do an LBO. That day's over. So now a corporate buyer's a legitimate buyer. It's a major company buys another company. It's not somebody who puts a thousand dollars down and borrow 23 billion and then tries to sell parts off. So I think corporate managements are doing a very good job of saving companies. But a lot of times it's a tough decision. They don't like lettin' people go. No one enjoys that. The question is, if we can slim down and get more efficient, it'd be better off for 90 percent of the employees than "If we don't do it, we could become another Eastern Air Lines, another Pan Am and everybody loses their job."

QA lot of people worry that the mutual fund pressure has caused a lot of pain in this country ...

A
Well, I think it was the recession of '81 and '82 that was the wake-up call. It wasn't the stock market. It wasn't mutual funds managers. It's competition. It's competitor in the apparel industry. It's competition in the textile industry. It's competitor in the housing industry. It's competitor in the broadcast industry independent of mutual fund managers. Now you look at AT&T, about 11 years ago they broke up AT&T, had one million employees. One out of every hundred Americans was working for the telephone company. If you put together AT&T and all the Baby Bells today, you'd have about 700-- less than 700,000 workers and they're doing double the amount of telephone calls, twenty times the faxes, a hundred times the data communications, a thousand times the cellular with 30 percent less employees. Now is that good for America or bad for America? Would we be better off if they had two million employees? I think we're just better off that they have less employees and they're doing a better job.

QWhy?

A
That's -- competition, because we have the lowest cost communication system in the world. It's the single most important thing. It's not the highway system. Communications is the single most important and we're the lowest cost. That helps us compete with the rest of the world.
Now hopefully these companies have done a good job when they had to let people go, they helped 'em find other jobs or they let people retire. I'm hoping they were good corporate citizens. That would be very good. That's important. So they just don't say, "Sorry, fellas. Sorry, lady. You're outta here." That would be not a very good thing to do. That'd be terrible. So that would be an abuse. That's not the way to treat people. But holding onto people and all of a sudden you have to cut everybody's pay by 10 percent and then cut everybody's pay by another 15 percent, then your whole company folds. No one wins by that.

QTalk companies that have gone public since the bull market started and the flow of capital ...

A
I get asked a lot by people, you know, "Where's this money that's going into mutual funds of my money? Other people's money. Where is this going to wind up?" One wonderful thing that happened, the last three years over a hundred-billion dollars has gone into initial public offerings. These are new companies coming public. We've had over 2,500 companies come public. That's over two a business day. These companies now have more money for equipment, more money for research. They have a better balance sheet. They can borrow more. They are going to hire more people and more jobs. These are going to be the companies like the next Staples, the next Federal Express, the next Compaq. That's what made America grow.
In the decade of the '80s the 500 largest companies eliminated three million jobs. We added 18 million jobs. This is the greed decade. The decade of the '80s we added 18 million jobs in the United States. There's 2.1 million businesses started. Some didn't make it, but they just had 10 jobs each. That's 21 million jobs. Some medium-sized companies grew to be big companies. That's what's made America grow. When the stock market does well the next two years or the next three years, that money's there. They've got it now. It didn't just go to a bunch of rich people. It went into the companies' treasuries. It's now being used for research & development. Companies like Amgen has come along and they have two one-billion-dollar drugs. Company didn't exist 20 years ago.

QSo my money winds up in Amgen?

A
The money the public puts into mutual funds, a large percentage of that is wound up going into finance new issues. From '65 to 1995 in America we added 54 million jobs. The European Union, the old Common Market, has 100 million more people. In those 30 years, they added 10 million jobs. They added 10 million jobs in 30 years. We added 54 million jobs. There's 10 percent unemployment in Europe, 20 million people out of work. We are very lucky we've had these companies come public. That's what made this country hold together. Business has done a terrific job. We ought to be very happy. I don't think 2,500 companies have come public in Europe since Charlemagne, and I think he became King of the Francs in 788. This is a wonderful thing we have in this country, this initial public offerings, putting money into small and medium-sized companies and let them grow.

Do you think Vinik got a bad rap, too much emphasis put on short-term record?

A
Jeff Vinik ran Magellan Fund for a little over four years. It beat the market. It beat 80 percent of all other funds. So if you went somewhere else, you would have been in the 80 percent that lost out to Magellan. Now the last nine months Magellan didn't have a great record, but when you have a basketball game and at the end of the game its 105 to 85, they don't say to the team, " the third quarter you lost by 32 to 22. What happened to the third quarter?" I mean I think a four years is a reasonable period of time to look over a record. I think Jeff Vinik did a very good job the time he ran Magellan.

Too much scrutiny is unfair at this point?

A
Well, I can't say whether there's too much scrutiny or not enough scrutiny. I think there's a lot of watching of the largest fund in the country. The question is, can it continue to beat the market like it's done under Morris Smith, under Jeff Vinik, and under Bob Stansky. And it's still a very small percent of the market. I mean 50 billion is a very large number, but when you think the New York Stock Exchange is five-and-a-half trillion. If you look at the hundred largest stocks over-the-counter, there's another trillion. You look at the 200 largest stocks overseas is several trillion, I mean it's not a very small -- it's a very small percentage of the available market. All you have to do really is find the best hundred stocks in the S&P 500 and find another few hundred outside the S&P 500 to beat the market.

價值投資 vs 時機投資

價值投資人利用「時間」來賺錢

儘量保持比較高的持股(本金大),利用選股的功力與持股的轉換,不太在意大盤指數的高低變化,因為價值投資人認為,大盤指數無法預測。典型的價值投資人專注在選股,透過質化與量化的分析找出好公司,並評估合理的股價,等待市場效率失靈的時機出現便宜的價位時,買進並長期持有。價值投資人在多頭多賺一些,在空頭少賠一些。很多人誤以為

價值投資 = 滿持股 + 長期持有

關於「滿持股」的風險在於多轉空的過程,如何做防禦?以免把多頭趨勢中的獲利,在空頭市場中全數回吐。而關於「長期持有」的必要條件就是持股成本夠低,以及公司可以穩健成長,為股東持續創造現金。買到產業趨勢向下或買進成本太高,長期持有只會越賠越多。

時機投資人利用「空間」賺錢

在多頭時做多,空頭時做空或是空手,亦或是降低持股。時機投資者在大部分人貪婪的時候賣出,在大部分人恐懼的時候買進。同時考慮總體經濟與景氣循環對股市的影響,進一步的分析大盤基期的高低,研究投資人的心理,採取不同的策略或持股比重。配合科斯托蘭尼的雞蛋理論,順應景氣循環當一位智慧投機者。時機投資人要避免當股市玩家,單純採用技術分析頻繁的進入股市。

大盤高低點可以預測嗎?底部、頭部真的抓的到嗎?這兩個問題,個人認為預測指數是多餘的、是自我設限,因為指數反映的是當時上市公司的總市值,重點是這樣的市值搭配的如何的總經數據、投資人的心理情緒、資金動能等等。

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經濟大衰退的情況

景氣時鐘拉警報,花旗並稱股債都邁入衰退下滑階段。

花旗的景氣時鐘共分四個階段,目前歐美都進入恐怖的第四階段,也就是信貸和股票雙雙走低。

花旗全球策略分析師巴克蘭解釋了景氣時鐘的循環方式:

第一階段:經濟衰退剛結束時,這段期間利率下滑、信貸擴張,但是股市仍低迷不振。

第二階段:牛市萌芽,低廉信貸推動股市起飛。

第三階段:股市持續上衝,但是風險日益提高,信貸利差日增,此一階段易出現泡沫。

第四階段:信貸緊縮,股市崩盤,常會引發經濟衰退。

巴克蘭說,股市和信貸雙雙下滑時,為典型熊市,此時企業獲利會大減、資產負債表惡化。

過去75年來,幾乎每一波經濟危機發生前,都出現油價飆漲現象。但現在令人擔憂的卻是能源價格下挫,可能把全球經濟推入衰退深淵。